iLt^ 


IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 


IS  WAR  DIMmiSHINGI 

A  STUDY  OF  THE  PREVALENCE  OF  WAR 
IN  EUROPE  FROM  1450  TO  THE  PRESENT  DAY 


BY 

FREDERICK  ADAMS  WOODS,  M.D. 

LECTinUER  IN   BIOLOGY  IN   THE   MASSACHUSETTS  INSTITUTE 

OF  technology;  author  of  "mental  and  moral  hebbdity 

IK  ROYALTY,"    "THE  INFLUENCE  OF  MONABCHS " 

AND 

ALEXANDER  BALTZLY 

ADAMS  WOODS  FELLOW  IN  HARVARD  UNIVBBSITY 
1913-1914 


BOSTON   AND   NEW    YORK 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

(Srtje  ii\itierj8ibe  ^u0  Camhrilige 

1915 


COPYRIGHT,   I915,  BY   FREDERICK  ADAMS  WOODS 
ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 

Ptihlished  November  IQ15 


ANNEX 

01 


PREFACE 


This  volume  represents  the  completion  of  a 
collection  of  dates  of  war  that  I  began  in  a 
more  or  less  rough  way  some  six  years  ago. 
Starting  with  the  history  of  England,  France, 
Spain,  and  Russia,  I  was  soon  greatly  struck 
by  the  failure  of  the  modern  centuries  to  give 
much  diminution  in  the  proportion  of  time 
devoted  to  the  horrible  art  of  war.  As  far  as 
these  nations  were  concerned,  it  seemed  that 
there  was  no  diminution  of  war  worth  speak- 
ing about.  I  was  surprised  to  find  that  in  the 
earlier  as  in  the  later  periods,  man  seemed  to 
have  fought  about  half  of  the  time,  and  not, 
as  is  often  erroneously  said,  almost  continu- 
ously in  the  early  stages  of  history.  I  did  not 
believe  that  a  natural  and  psychological  phe- 
nomenon which  had  persisted  so  constantly 
could  suddenly  cease;  and  indeed  these  dates 
that  I  had  collected  influenced  my  whole  at- 
titude on  the  great  questions  of  internation- 
alism versus  nationalism,  and  pacifism  versus 
preparedness. 

Publication  was  delayed  by  other  inter- 
ests, but  in  October,  1913,  Mr.  Baltzly,  on  his 
appointment  as  Adams  Woods  Fellow  in  the 
Department  of  Government  in  Harvard  Uni- 


vi  PREFACE 

versity,  took  over  the  material  which  I  had 
collected,  and,  besides  verifying  or  correcting 
the  dates  in  a  thorough  way,  was  able  to  add 
material  from  the  histories  of  a  number  of 
smaller  nations  in  Europe.  These  smaller 
nations,  and  likewise  Austria  and  Prussia, 
all  showed  a  decline  in  the  amount  of  war. 
Still,  I  am  not  certain  that  there  is  good 
proof  that  warfare  is  tending  to  disappear 
with  the  advance  of  the  ages. 

Mr.  Baltzly's  work  was  begun  with  no 
theors^  in  mind;  to  quote  his  own  words, 
*' neither  a  romantic  delight  in  war,  nor  hold- 
ing a  brief  for  the  peace  societies."  It  was 
something  of  a  question  in  our  own  minds, 
and  also  in  the  minds  of  historians  with  whom 
we  talked,  whether  one  could  always  decide 
just  whether  a  nation  was  at  war  or  not,  and 
just  when  a  war  began  and  when  it  ended. 
Mr.  Baltzly  used  his  own  judgment  as  to 
what  to  include  as  technically  a  war.  Other 
judgments  would  necessarily  differ,  but  it  is 
not  likely  that  they  would  do  so  except  to  a 
minor  extent,  and  they  would  certainly  not 
affect  the  conclusions.  As  for  the  conclusions 
that  are  here  drawn  I  am  myself  largely 
responsible,  as  I  am  entirely  for  the  intro- 
ductory chapter.  The  dates  of  the  wars  as 
they  stand  at  present  are  entirely  the  work  of 
Mr.  Baltzly,  who  is  also  responsible  in  part 


PREFACE  vu 

for  the  descriptive  text.  In  counting  up  the 
years  of  war  for  each  half-century  we  have 
avoided  the  confusion  and  difficulty  of  know- 
ing just  the  month  a  war  began  or  ended,  by 
simply  taking  the  first  year  and  the  last  year 
as  if  they  were  always  one  half  of  a  year.  Also 
all  the  wars  that  began  and  ended  in  the 
same  year  would  on  the  average  be  about 
six  months  long,  and  have  so  been  taken. 

It  is  hardly  to  be  expected  that  these  dates 
will  forever  stand  without  further  correction, 
but  until  something  better  is  brought  out  it 
is  believed  that  this  publication,  aside  from 
its  contribution  to  the  science  of  quantitative 
historical  interpretation  (historiometry),  will 
serve  as  a  handy  book  of  reference  to  histo- 
rians. 

Frederick  Adams  Woods 

BROOKLINE,    MASSACHUSETTS 

August  y  1915 


AUTHORITIES  CONSULTED 

Statistics  of  the  dates  of  war  must  needs  be  gathered 
in  a  great  variety  of  works;  some  of  these  are  chrono- 
logical, some  are  narrative.  I  will  note  those  most 
often  consulted  in  this  research. 

The  most  useful  encyclopaedic  guide  in  the  domain 
of  war  is  the  ninth  volume  of  a  Handbuchfiir  Heer  und 
Flotte,  by  G.  von  Alten  and  H.  von  Albert  (Berlin, 
Leipzig,  Wien,  and  Stuttgart,  1912).  It  is  part  of  a 
large  work,  still  in  process  of  completion,  which  aims 
to  give  in  dictionary  form  an  "  Encyklopadie  der  Krieg- 
swissenschaften."  The  ninth  volume  is,  however,  com- 
plete in  itself  and  covers  the  field  in  considerable  detail, 
especially  for  the  things  German.  Its  weakness  appears 
to  be  a  meagerness  in  the  field  of  English  history. 

The  Cambridge  Modern  History  affords  aid  in  this 
direction.  Other  general  books  have  been  useful,  such 
as  Richard  Lodge's  Close  of  the  Middle  Ages,  which  is 
better  for  chronological  detail,  perhaps,  than  for  any 
other  purpose.  For  the  nineteenth  century  nothing  is 
more  valuable  than  the  Epitome  of  Universal  History 
of  Carl  Ploetz,  enlarged  and  corrected  in  the  last  Amer- 
ican edition  by  William  H.  Tillinghast  (Boston  and 
New  York,  1909).  For  the  eighteenth  century,  also, 
considerable  reliance  may  be  placed  on  Ploetz ;  for  the 
Middle  Ages  and  earlier  modem  period,  except  in 
German  history,  Ploetz  is  not  reliable  in  any  matter 
that  demands  accuracy.  The  Annual  Register  is  valu- 
able so  far  as  it  covers  the  field,  that  is,  from  the  mid- 
eighteenth  century  onward. 

No  great  difficulty  exists,  however,  for  the  eight- 
eenth and  nineteenth  centuries.    Certainty  may  be 


X  AUTHORITIES  CONSULTED 

approximated  since  1700  in  almost  all  cases.  The 
greatest  troubles  are  met  with  in  the  fifteenth  century 
and  those  immediately  succeeding,  especially  in  East- 
ern Europe. 

For  Austria-Hungary  the  two  special  histories  used 
were:  Alfonso  Huber,  Geschichte  Oesterreichs  (Gotha, 
1885-1896,  5  vols.),  a  work  which  extends  only  as  far 
as  1648,  and  Louis  Leger,  Histoire  de  V Autriche-Hon- 
grie,  depuis  les  origines  jusqua  Vannee  1889  (third 
edition,  Paris,  1889). 

For  Denmark:  Carl  Ferdinand  Allen's  Danish  his- 
tory in  French  translation,  Histoire  de  Danemark 
(Copenhague,  1878,  2  vols.),  and  Nesbit  Bain's  History 
of  Denmark,  Norway,  and  Sweden,  1513-1900  (Cam- 
bridge, 1905). 

For  England:  Samuel  Rawson  Gardiner's  Students 
History  of  England,  which  is  arranged  in  capital  style 
for  chronological  purposes. 

Little  difficulty  exists  for  France  since  the  appear- 
ance of  the  admirable  collaborative  work,  edited  by 
Ernest  Lavisse,  Histoire  de  France  (Paris,  1904). 

For  Holland:  Petrus  Johannes  Blok's  Geschiedenis 
van  het  Nederlandsche  volk  (Groningen,  1892-1908, 
8  vols.),  which  appears  in  English  translation  by  Oscar 
A.  Biersaadt  and  Ruth  Putnam  (New  York  and 
London,  1898-1912,  3  vols.),  is  an  excellent  work. 

The  figures  for  Prussia  are  not  difficult  to  get,  al- 
though Herbert  Tuttle's  History  of  Prussia  (Boston, 
1884-1896,  4  vols.)  is  not  an  adequate  work  in  every 
way.  M.  Waddington  was  able  to  carry  his  Histoire  de 
Prusse  through  the  first  volume  only.  Droyssen's 
Geschichte  des  Preussischen  Politik  (Berlin,  1855-1886, 
5  vols.)  is  one  of  the  best  authorities  for  this  purpose. 

Great  difficulties  attended  the  compilation  for  Rus- 
sia, for  which  Karamsin's  Istoria  gosudarstva  rossi- 
iskavo  (St.  Petersburg,  1880-1889, 12  vols,  in  6)  is  good 


AUTHORITIES  CONSULTED  xi 

as  far  as  it  goes,  i.  e.,  to  1613.  Sergius  Solevev's  Is- 
toria  Rossii  (19  vols,  in  9,  1857-1869)  is  good  for  the 
rest  of  the  seventeenth  century  and  until  1732.  Alfred 
Rambaud's  Histoire  de  la  Russie  (Paris,  1900,  fifth 
edition)  has  many  inaccuracies,  but  is  usefid. 

No  very  admirable  general  history  of  Spain  exists; 
the  nearest  approach,  perhaps,  is  the  rather  ill-ar- 
ranged work  now  in  progress  by  Rafael  Altamira  y 
Crevea,  Historia  de  Espana  y  de  la  civilizacion  eS' 
panola^  completed  as  far  as  the  early  nineteenth  cen- 
tury in  four  volumes  (Barcelona,  1900-1911). 

For  Sweden,  in  addition  to  Bain's  work,  referred  to 
under  Denmark,  are  F.  F.  Carlson's  History  of  Sweden, 
translated  in  German  (Gotha,  1855)  as  Geschichte 
SchwedenSy  a  continuation  of  Erik  Gustav  Geijer's 
Svenska  folkets  historia  (Stokholm,  1876,  3  vols.), 
translated  in  English  by  J.  H.  Turner  (London,  1845). 

No  work  referred  to  is  more  satisfactory,  in  some 
ways,  than  the  recent  Geschichte  des  osmanischen 
Reiches  (5  vols.,  Gotha,  1908-1913)  of  Professor 
Neculai  Jorga,  of  Bucharest.  For  chronological  pur- 
poses Jorga's  work  is  somewhat  difficult  to  use,  but  its 
thoroughness  cannot  be  doubted. 

In  connection  with  one  of  the  many  questions  that 
come  up  as  corollaries  of  this  statistical  report,  a  little 
book  of  charts,  by  Otto  Berndt,  entitled  Die  Zahl  im 
KriegCy  may  be  mentioned.  It  shows  in  graphic  form 
the  relative  sizes  of  the  nineteenth-century  armies  in 
European  wars. 

A.  Baltzly. 


CONTENTS 

I.  Introductory 1 

n.  Is  War  Diminishing? 28 

in.  Austria  and  the  Hapsburgs      ....  33 

IV.  Denmark 39 

V.  England 43 

VI.  France 53 

Vn.  Holland 64 

Vm.  The  Old  Kingdom  of  Poland      ....  67 

IX.   HOHENZOLLERN  PrUSSIA     (ThE     GeRMAN     EM- 
PIRE FROM  1871) 72 

X.  Russia 76 

XI.  Spain 84 

Xn.  Sweden 89 

Xm.  Turkey 94 

Appendix 101 


IS  WAE  DIMimSHII^G? 
I 

INTRODUCTORY 

Within  the  last  twenty  years  hundreds  and 
hundreds  of  books  and  pamphlets  have  been 
published  on  the  subject  of  war  and  peace; 
but  these  have  been  almost  without  exception 
from  the  emotional,  personal,  and  subjective 
point  of  view.  It  is  strange  that  among  the 
host  of  well-meaning  pacifists  and  in  the 
phalanx  of  sturdy  militarists,  where  the  as- 
sumption is  rife  that  war  is  to  cease  or  ought 
to  cease,  no  one  apparently  has  taken  the 
pains  to  find  out  if  war  really  is  ceasing.  No 
one  has  made  appeal  to  the  simplest  facts 
of  history  bearing  on  the  philosophy  of  war, 
namely,  the  dates  of  wars,  —  the  definite 
actual  years  of  peace  and  of  war  that  have 
accompanied  the  lives  of  successive  genera- 
tions of  men.  Are  the  periods  of  war  declin- 
ing and  the  periods  of  peace  increasing?  Can 
we  conclude  from  a  broad  survey  of  history 
that  the  forces  of  evolution  have  tended  to 
make  warfare  of  less  and  less  importance  as 
the  centuries  have  rolled  on?  May  we  not 
raise  the  question,  —  Is  not  war  likely  to  be 


2  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

more  Important  rather  than  less  as  time  goes 
on? 

War,  like  any  natural  phenomenon,  has  a 
space  as  well  as  a  time  element.  Wars  may- 
be less  frequent  than  formerly,  yet  they  may 
be  greater  in  magnitude,  involving  larger 
proportions  of  the  total  population.  They 
may  be  more  bitterly  fought  and  subject  to 
less  interruption  than  in  the  olden  times;  and 
also  the  suffering  may  be  greater  even  in  spite 
of  advancing  knowledge  and  skill  in  the  care 
of  the  wounded.  The  present  war  makes  us 
quite  willing  to  believe  the  most  pessimistic 
assertions,  whereas  a  few  years  ago  a  very 
large  proportion  of  well-informed  people 
would  have  scouted  the  idea  that  war  was  to 
be  as  important  a  factor  in  the  future  of  man 
as  it  had  been  in  the  past.  That  is  because  the 
majority  of  people  who  study  history  do  not 
learn  anything  from  it.  They  read  here  and 
there  as  their  fancy  directs.  They  are  as 
likely  to  have  a  false  impression  as  a  true  one. 

The  more  they  read,  perhaps,  the  worse  off 
they  are,  since  they  are  sure  to  remember 
just  that  portion  of  history  that  will  bend 
further  their  already  warped  judgment.  Men 
who  are  effective  as  writers,  speakers,  or 
political  leaders  are  bound  to  have  their 
theories,  prejudices,  and  convictions.  Gen- 
erally the  more  powerful  they  are  the  more 


INTRODUCTORY  3 

hidebound  are  their  beHefs  and  the  more 
dogmatic  their  assertions.  They  must  speak 
ex  cathedra.  The  pubKc  does  not  wish  for 
proofs,  it  merely  wishes  to  hear  well  expressed 
those  ideas  that  happen  to  be  in  vogue  in  its 
own  sect,  caste,  nation,  or  party.  All  this  is 
inevitable  and  natural,  yet  it  ought  to  be  fully 
realized  that  these  gifted  guides  of  public 
opinion  may  do  a  great  deal  of  harm.  They 
do  not  seek  the  truth.  They  injure  the  prog- 
ress of  truth.  They  waste  time  in  fruitless 
discussion.  They  distract  the  world's  atten- 
tion from  the  true  and  only  fountain  source 
of  information  which  is  and  always  must  be 
research. 

It  was  with  a  wholesome  disgust  at  the 
unscientific  character  of  the  publications  of 
various  peace  societies  that  I  began  to  col- 
lect these  few  humble  facts.  And  why  should 
there  be  several  peace  societies  one  might  ask. 
Is  there  to  be  such  a  thing  as  human  rivalry 
even  here.^  Perhaps  the  pacifists  have  been 
hard  enough  hit  by  the  present  manifesta- 
tions of  reality  against  theory,  but  when  one 
re-reads  the  publications  of  some  of  these  so- 
cieties, printed  before  the  present  war,  and 
sees  the  way  that  persons  who  pride  them- 
selves on  having  the  superior  moral  point  of 
view  openly  disregard  the  truth,  one  is  not 
very  sympathetic  if  they  suffer  somewhat. 


4  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

Peace  advocates  start  with  the  assumption 
that  their  convictions  are  the  only  true  moral 
principles.  They  see  a  future  civilization  in 
which  uniformity  and  helpfulness  shall  take 
the  place  of  rivalry  and  brute  force.  The 
militarists  reply  (as  a  matter  of  fact  most 
military  people  do  not  reply  at  all  because 
they  are  largely  men  who  do  things  rather 
than  men  who  discuss  things), — militarist 
philosophers,  we  might  say,  of  the  Teutonic 
type  reply,  that  success  in  modern  war  is 
essentially  intellectual,  a  matter  of  brain  and 
eye,  not  of  leg  and  biceps,  of  organization 
and  leadership,  of  discipline,  control,  and 
self-sacrifice.  In  a  word,  it  is  the  farthest  re- 
moved from  the  brutal,  in  the  sense  of  being 
animal  or  low,  in  the  scale  of  organic  evolu- 
tion; a  nation  at  war  is  the  most  highly  com- 
plex organic  aggregate  that  we  know  any- 
thing about.  Man  has  arrived  in  control  of 
nature  because  he  is  a  fighting  animal  and 
more  than  the  other  animals  he  fought  his 
way  forward  by  reason  of  his  brain.  All  the 
leading  races  of  the  world  are  descended  f  rora 
the  conquerors  of  the  world.  The  progres- 
sive whites  of  Western  Europe  and  Northern 
America  are  essentially  conquerors.  The 
Japanese,  the  only  progressive  people  in 
Asia,  are  essentially  conquerors.  The  world's 
future  progress  will  depend  on  what  kind  of 


INTRODUCTORY  5 

people  control  its  surface  and  dominate  its 
activities.  Here,  then,  is  the  true  altar  for 
the  highest  moral  sacrifice — devotion  to  the 
great  complex  aggregate  to  which  you  by  na- 
ture belong;  work  and  duty,  with  hope  and 
indeed  conviction  that  your  nation  and  race 
is  to  survive  and  play  its  part  in  the  future. 
What  larger  ideal  does  man  really  know  than 
this?  What  evidence  has  Nature  ever  given 
that  she  wants  all  races  to  survive  .^^  Every- 
thing indicates  that  some  races  sink.  Do  you 
wish  it  to  be  yours.?  Do  you  wish  to  have  your 
children  subject  to  a  race  whose  ideals  seem 
repugnant  compared  to  your  own.?  Each  ac- 
cording to  his  own,  as  he  sees  the  right,  must 
fight  for  the  right  as  he  sees  it.  There  can  be 
no  higher  glory. 

It  is  not  with  a  wish  to  place  the  moral 
standard  of  the  militarists  above  that  of  the 
pacifists  that  I  give  their  point  of  view.  I  do 
not  even  attempt  to  show  that  there  is  just 
as  much  to  be  said  on  this  side  as  on  the 
other.  I  do  not  pretend  to  know  anything  of 
moral  questions,  and  am  not  much  interested 
in  them  at  present  except  to  raise  this  protest. 
As  a  man  of  science  I  should  like  meekly  to 
ask  these  professors  of  ethics,  law,  and  justice, 
these  presidents  of  colleges,  these  moral  edu- 
cators, if  morality  is  not  necessarily  bound  up 
with  truth. 


6  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

The  pacifists  have  a  right,  I  take  it,  to 
start  with  a  subjective  assumption  based  on 
their  own  inner  feelings,  but  they  certainly 
have  no  right  to  pervert  the  facts  by  ignor- 
ing or  denying  all  unwelcome  truths. 

The  type  of  ideal  of  the  Carnegie  Endow- 
ment for  International  Peace  is  shown  in  one 
of  the  publications  of  the  American  Asso- 
ciation for  International  Conciliation  written 
by  a  prominent  member  of  their  Executive 
Committee  and  also  trustee  of  the  Carnegie 
Endowment.-^ 

"The  cynic  smiles;  and  well  he  may.  Hu- 
man nature  is  not  to  be  made  over  in  a  day, 
or  in  a  year,  or  in  a  century.  But  the  man  who 
is  clear-sighted  enough  to  perceive  and  to 
understand  the  everlasting  force  of  a  moral 
principle  will  not  cease  to  work  for  its  accom- 
plishment because  the  time  of  that  accom- 
plishment is  in  the  far  distance.  Moreover, 
there  are  many  things  within  the  range  of 
practical  international  politics  that  can  be 
begun  at  once  and  done  speedily." 

"All  this  philosophy  of  civilization  was 
presupposed  by  the  trustees  of  the  Carnegie 
Endowment  when  ]  they  began  their  work. 
They  perceived  that  the  minds  of  men  must 
be  convinced  that  morality  is  a  higher  prin- 

*  Publication  No.  75,  Febnian*,  1914,  by  Nicholas  Murray  Butler, 
President  of  Columbia  University,  pages  4[-5. 


INTRODUCTORY  7 

ciple  than  brute  force,  and  that  it  must  be 
proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  public  opinion 
that  the  balance  of  individual,  social,  and 
political  gain  is  on  the  side  of  peace  and  in- 
ternational friendship." 

In  other  words,  no  matter  whether  the 
balance  of  social  and  political  gain  is  on  the 
side  of  peace  or  on  the  side  of  successful  war, 
we  shall  pretend  that  it  is  on  the  side  of  peace. 
The  writer  goes  on  in  the  following  words: 
*'To  accomplish  these  ends  elaborate  and 
prolonged  studies,  highly  scientific  in  char- 
acter, must  be  made  and  their  results  pub- 
lished to  the  world."  A  little  further  down 
the  page  he  says:  **It  will  not  be  long  before 
the  publication  of  the  results  of  these  scien- 
tific undertakings  will  begin,  and  it  may  safely 
be  predicted,  not  only  that  the  volumes  con- 
taining them  will  constitute  an  indispen- 
sable library  for  the  publicist,  but  also  that 
they  will  contain  material  which,  in  the  hands 
of  skilled  and  experienced  propagandists,  can 
be  made  to  count  heavily  in  the  enlighten- 
ment of  public  opinion  everywhere." 

Again  the  "cynic  smiles,"  but  this  time  at 
what  constitutes  in  the  minds  of  some  peo- 
ple a  highly  scientific  method.  But  the  cynic 
will  certainly  agree  that  it  may  be  predicted 
that  the  volumes  will  be  used  by  the  propa- 
gandists.   Such,  then,  is  a  frank  confession 


8  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

of  the  way  one  prominent  pacifist  regards 
the  problem. 

In  another  pamphlet  called  "The  Dawn 
of  World  Peace,"  William  Howard  Taft 
states:  *'The  battlefield  as  a  place  of  settle- 
ment of  disputes  is  gradually  yielding  to 
arbitral  courts  of  justice.  The  interests  of 
the  great  masses  are  not  being  sacrificed,  as 
in  former  times,  to  the  selfishness,  ambitions, 
and  aggrandizement  of  sovereigns,  or  to  the 
intrigues  of  statesmen  unwilling  to  surrender 
their  scepter  of  power.  Religious  wars  happily 
are  specters  of  a  mediaeval  or  ancient  past, 
and  the  Christian  Church  is  laboring  vali- 
antly to  fulfill  its  destiny  of  '  Peace  on  earth.' " 

Professor  Edward  L.  Thorndike  writing 
from  the  psychologist's  standpoint,  in  1911,^ 
and  apparently  influenced  by  an  essay  of 
William  James's  on  this  same  subject,  shows 
how  deluded  a  man  who  usually  bases  his 
statements  on  quantitative  research  may 
become  when  he  launches  into  the  flowery 
domain  of  the  philosophy  of  history.  Pro- 
fessor Thorndike  ignores  the  important  fact 
that  we  cannot  yet  dogmatize  as  to  the  causes 
of  war.  He  seems  to  assume  that  armed  con- 
flict arises  from  something  in  the  minds  of 
the  common  people,  some  natural  longing  for 

*  The  Emotional  Price  of  Peace,  American  Association  for  Inter- 
national Conciliation,  No.  45,  August,  1911. 


INTRODUCTORY  9 

excitement  and  adventure,  that  has  to  be 
satisfied  somehow  and  might  be  vicariously 
satisfied  in  some  other  form  of  daring.  He 
takes  no  cognizance  of  the  uniform  and  will- 
ing peacefulness  of  men  during  periods  of 
peace,  until  they  have  been  inspired  to  go 
forth  to  war.  It  would  seem  that  in  1911  Pro- 
fessor Thorndike  did  not  expect  that  there 
would  be  much  more  war.  He  writes  as  fol- 
lows: "We  are  all  learning  that  a  righteous 
cause  is  a  cause  for  war  only  when  the  wrong 
done  by  the  war  is  less  than  the  right  it  pre- 
serves. Nor  will  there  be  in  the  future  any 
such  readiness  as  there  has  been  in  the  past 
to  assume  that  the  war  which  some  one  is  in- 
terested in  stirring  up  is  really  in  the  defense 
of  national  welfare."  He  takes  no  account  of 
the  actual  grouping  of  mankind  into  more  or 
less  definite  units  under  more  or  less  cen- 
tralized control  from  the  top,  or  if  he  does  he 
assumes  that  this  in  the  future  is  to  disappear, 
whereas  in  fact,  perhaps,  it  is  to  increase. 
Who  knows  .^^ 

The  superficial  and  subjective  interpreta- 
tion of  history,  the  complete  misunderstand- 
ing as  to  war's  causation,  is  well  shown  in 
Pamphlet  No.  70  of  the  same  International 
Conciliation  Association.  This  was  written 
in  September,  1913.  As  this  author  ^  has  ex- 

*  Randolph  S.  Bourne. 


10  IS  WAR  DEVIINISHING? 

pressed  most  of  the  commonplace  pacifist 
ideas,  '* world  is  a  miit,"  "interdependence 
of  the  nations,"  ''delicacy  of  international 
credit,"  etc.,  a  full  quotation  of  the  last  para- 
graphs from  this  publication  will  serve  as  an 
expression  of  some  of  the  theories  of  this  sect. 
It  must  be  conceded  that  the  predictions  have 
not  been  fulfilled :  — 

"With  the  unification  of  Germany  and  the 
freeing  of  the  Balkan  States,  the  center  of 
gravity  of  international  politics  shifted  from 
Europe  to  the  conflicting  spheres  of  interest 
in  Asia  and  ^Africa.  A  long  period  seems  now 
about  to  ensue  of  adjustment  of  power  and 
influence,  accompanied  by  inevitable  bound- 
ary and  trade  and  colonial  disputes.  It  will 
all  be  accomplished  with  a  fraction  of  the 
bloodshed  and  labor  that  was  wasted  on  the 
similar  process  in  Europe.  The  Hague  Court 
provides  the  machinery  for  the  settling  of 
the  legal  questions  involved;  the  political 
questions  will  be  settled  by  diplomatic  nego- 
tiation and  international  conferences  and 
commissions.  Slowly  we  may  expect,  as  an 
international  public  opinion  is  formed,  to  see 
a  body  of  criminal  international  law  devel- 
oped, and  the  most  crucial  questions  of  in- 
ternational interests  resolved  by  arbitration. 
Meanwhile  none  of  the  media  can  be  neg- 
lected.  The  peaceful  settlement  of  interna- 


INTRODUCTORY  11 

tional  disputes,  based  on  rivalries  of  prestige^ 
must  be  the  supreme  aim  of  the  Peace  Move- 
ment." 

"Such  a  peaceful  settlement  is  being  fur- 
thered by  the  recognition  that  is  rapidly  per- 
meating the  minds  of  the  Western  peoples 
that  the  world  is  a  unit.  The  wits  of  dip- 
lomats are  being  sharpened  by  the  discovery 
that  war  does  not  pay.  International  con- 
ference and  negotiation  has  become  an  actual 
economic  necessity.  The  enormous  develop- 
ment of  industrial  technique  during  the  last 
century,  the  utilization  of  natural  resources, 
combined  with  the  existence  of  a  flood  of 
capital  ready  to  flow  to  any  part  of  the  earth 
that  needs  it  in  its  economic  development, 
have  produced  an  economic  interweaving  and 
interdependence  of  the  nations  that  is  with- 
out parallel  in  history.  Capital  knows  no 
country;  by  foreign  investment  nations  are 
knit  together  in  bonds  which  defy  all  irra- 
tional prejudices  and  sudden  or  age-long 
jealousies.  There  is  an  international  system 
of  credit  so  delicate  that  a  shock  at  any  point 
means  calamity  to  the  entire  fabric.  The  suc- 
cessful conquest  of  one  nation  by  another 
would  simply  mean  the  destruction  of  the 
financial  prosperity  of  the  conqueror.  Even 
the  conquest  of  an  undeveloped  country  like 
Tripoli  hardly  redounds  to  the  prosperity  of 


12  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

Italy,  for  the  latter  will  depend  upon  foreign 
capital  for  the  development  of  the  resources, 
and  the  riches  of  Tripoli  will  drain  away  to  the 
profit  of  the  financially  capable  nations." 

''The  idea  is  also  seeping  down  through  the 
racial  consciousness  of  the  Western  peoples 
that  war  is  physically  suicidal  as  well  as  eco- 
nomically unprofitable.  War  eliminates  not 
the  unfit,  as  its  admirers  so  fondly  claim,  but 
the  fittest  and  best.  Europe  is  weaker,  not 
stronger,  for  the  men  she  has  lost  in  war.  This 
country  is  mentally  and  morally  feebler  for 
the  slaughter  of  her  finest  manhood  in  the 
Civil  War.  The  very  perfection  of  armaments 
and  the  terrific  drain  of  cost  is  already  mak- 
ing warfare  almost  impossible.  The  nations 
are  now  on  the  verge  of  bankruptcy,  and 
actually  do  not  dare  to  fight." 

"These  are  the  economic  and  psychological 
forces  that  are  driving  physical  aggression 
and  coercion  from  the  field  of  international 
relations,  and  bringing  diplomacy  and  arbitra- 
tion to  the  front,  not  as  supplements,  but  as 
actual  substitutes  for  war.  The  various  in- 
stitutions which  we  have  considered  above 
are  becoming  the  institutional  expression  of 
a  world-consciousness  analogous  to  the  con- 
sciousness of  ethnic  or  national  unity.  A  real 
feeling  of  'internationality'  is  being  born. 
While  we  have  been  hoping,  the  nations  have 


INTRODUCTORY  13 

become  linked  in  an  interweaving  of  interests 
so  powerful  that  the  successful  functioning 
of  each  part  depends  upon  the  prosperity  of 
every  other  part.  World-wide  arbitration  or 
world-federation  will  be  but  the  recognition 
of  the  fact  that  war  is  world-suicide.  Nations 
will  fight  only  when  the  world  has  lost  all  its 
hope  and  all  its  sanity." 

Another  publication  called  "The  Phases 
of  Progress  towards  Peace,"  ^  by  President 
S.  C.  Mitchell,  of  the  University  of  South 
Carolina,  dwells  much  on  the  optimistic  side 
of  the  case.  He  writes  as  if  selfish  national 
interests  hardly  existed.  ''The  world  has 
shrunk  to  the  dimensions  of  a  township,  all 
men  are  neighbors."  This  writer  has  a  good 
deal  to  say  about  the  value  of  neutralization, 
and  agreements  to  delimit  war.  Thus  Belgium 
is  among  the  specially  favored  nations. 

"Just  as  the  benefits  of  freedom  presented 
in  the  Northwest  a  permanent  contrast  to 
slavery,  so  any  sphere  of  civilization  dedi- 
cated to  peace  will  serve  as  a  standing  argu- 
ment against  the  senselessness  of  seeking  to 
determine  questions  of  international  justice 
by  vast  military  establishments  for  organized 
murder.  In  fact,  the  neutralization  of  such 
countries  as  Belgium  and  Switzerland  are  a 

1  Publication  No.  12  of  the  Maryland  Peace  Society,  November, 
1912,  page  6.  ^ 


14  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

present  application  to  war  of  the  very  prin- 
ciple of  geographical  delimitation  which 
proved  effective  in  dealing  with  slavery. 
Delimitation  of  war,  by  curtailing  the  cate- 
gory of  questions  which  may  give  rise  to  war 
on  the  part  of  such  signally  conspicuous 
nations  as  England,  France,  and  America, 
would  amount  to  a  demonstration  of  the  ef- 
fectiveness of  reason  over  brute  force  in  the 
attainment  of  justice  that  must  prove  ir- 
resistible to  mankind." 

All  this  written  a  few  years  ago  reads  sadly 
enough  just  how.  Not  only  have  we  been  told 
that  in  this  commercial  age  the  great  bank- 
ing interests  controlled  the  question  of  peace 
and  war,  but  we  have  also  been  assured  that 
the  great  force  of  International  Socialism 
would  render  impossible  a  world-wide  con- 
flict. The  socialists  claimed  to  total  ten  or 
twelve  million  votes  and  thirty  million  or 
more  adherents.  Judging  from  their  talk  at 
International  Congresses  there  seemed  little 
likelihood  that  the  great  bodies  of  socialist 
workmen  could  be  easily  induced  to  take  up 
war;  but  no  people  were  quicker  to  fly  to  arms 
than  these  same  socialists.  Their  protest  was 
practically  nil.  Instead  of  holding  together  in 
united  brotherhood  each  faction  is  now  call- 
ing the  other  traitor.  The  socialists  like  the 
pacifists  were  in  complete  misunderstanding 


INTRODUCTORY  15 

as  to  the  psychology  of  war  and  the  position 
of  war  as  a  phenomenon  in  human  evolution. 
They  completely  misjudged  the  primordial 
instincts  and  falsely  prophesied  through  lack 
of  fundamental  knowledge  either  biological 
or  historical. 

The  activities  of  the  militarists  a  few  years 
ago  in  England  and  in  France  are  now  grate- 
fully accepted  by  all  classes.  It  is  not  prob- 
able that  many  are  wishing  that  they  had 
been  less  well  prepared.  Discussion  has  given 
place  to  action.  There  is  no  time  at  present 
for  anything  else;  but  after  this  war  is  over 
(or  seemingly  over)  there  will  be  a  great  deal 
of  discussion  about  the  question  of  perma- 
nent peace.  When  that  time  arrives  it  is  to  be 
hoped  that  the  present  cataclysm  will  have 
shown  the  theorists  how  tremendously  com- 
plicated the  problem  is,  and  that  they  will 
treat  the  question  with  more  humble  regard. 
The  criticisms  that  I  have  brought  forward 
have  been  made  not  with  the  idea  of  useless 
ridicule,  but  to  illustrate  the  complexity  of 
the  problem,  and  the  need  of  honest  system- 
atic research. 

Much  that  is  one-sided  might  also  be  found 
in  writings  of  the  extreme  militarists.  There  is 
one  idea  in  particular,  often  quoted  either  hy 
them  or  brought  up  against  them,  that  is  now 
in  poor  repute,  —  that  is  the  contention  that 


16  IS  WAK  DEVIINISHING? 

armies  "preserve  the  peace,"  or  are  "for  the 
purpose  of  preserving  the  peace."  The  ad- 
vocates of  universal  peace  naturally  say  "the 
present  war  has  absolutely  disproved  the  con- 
tention that  strong  militarism  will  preserve 
the  peace."  The  militarists  ought  never  to 
have  said  that  an  army  was  to  preserve  the 
peace.  If  they  had  spoken  frankly,  they 
would  have  said  that  the  function  of  an  army 
is  to  win  in  war.  This  idea,  during  times  of 
peace  being  repugnant  to  the  popular  mind,  it 
has  always  been  thought  the  proper  thing  for 
each  nation  to  speak  of  its  own  army  as  an 
army  of  defense.  Since  at  any  time  in  history 
some  nations  are  growing  and  gaining  in 
strength  and  others  are  becoming  less  strong, 
it  is  impossible  that  all  armies  should  be 
armies  of  defense.  All  armies  that  are  rela- 
tively growing  are  potentially,  presumably, 
armies  of  conquest.  When  the  trial  comes 
they  may  or  may  not  meet  the  test.  Since 
wars  usually  cannot  come  out  exactly  even, 
either  these  armies  of  potential  conquest  be- 
come armies  of  real  conquest,  or  else  if  they 
are  beaten  some  other  army  is  proved  to  have 
been  indeed  an  army  of  potential  conquest. 

One  does  not  need  to  multiply  instances  to 
show  how  confused  and  gratuitous  are  most 
of  the  utterances  upon  the  philosophy  of  war. 
If  one  were  studying  the  philosophy  of  vice 


INTRODUCTORY  17 

it  would  not  be  thought  unfitting  to  admit 
that  the  problem  was  a  hard  one,  that  human 
frailty  and  passion  had  existed  since  time 
immemorial,  that  human  nature  had  changed 
but  little  if  at  all,  that  a  phenomenon  that 
had  been  in  existence  for  thousands  of  years 
would  probably  show  itself  to  some  extent 
one  hundred  or  two  hundred  years  hence. 
What,  then,  is  the  reason  that  well-meaning 
and  intelligent  people  are  not  prepared  to 
take  the  same  attitude  about  war,  —  or  to 
accept  the  view  that  war  is  likely  to  exist  in 
some  form  and  to  some  extent  one  or  two 
hundred  years  hence? 

Probably  the  difference  lies  in  this,  —  one 
is  a  constant  phenomenon  while  the  other  is 
intermittent.  Vice  is  to  some  extent  always 
present  and  is  constantly  brought  to  our  at- 
tention by  the  daily  press.  War,  on  the  other 
hand,  occurs  with  long  interruptions,  so  that 
whole  generations  of  men  may  live  and  die 
without  ever  experiencing  it.  Furthermore 
all  emotional  and  bodily  feelings,  passions 
and  instinctive  responses,  are  very  difficult 
to  conjure  up  when  tbey  are  not  actually 
felt.  Just  think,  even,  how  difficult  it  is  in 
the  cold  of  winter  to  conceive  that  we  shall 
ever  again  suffer  from  extreme  heat,  or  vice 
versa,  on  a  frightfully  hot  day  in  summer  to 
imagine  Arctic  cold.  Under  ordinary  condi- 


18  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

tions  it  is  questionable  if  any  one  can  imagine 
the  agonies  of  thirst  suffered  by  a  man  lost  in 
the  desert.  A  nation  at  war  is  in  a  different 
instinctive  and  emotional  state  from  a  nation 
at  peace.  It  has  responded  to  instincts  not 
called  forth  in  times  of  peace,  tribal  and  gre- 
garious instincts  always  potentially  present  in 
all  groups  of  men  but  lying  dormant  until  re- 
quired. The  war  instinct  is  probably  a  differ- 
ent thing  from  the  fighting  instinct.  These 
instincts  may  have  had  a  related  beginning 
far  back  in  early  organic  evolution,  but  they 
now  seem  distinct,  both  in  their  origin  and 
their  utility. 

The  fighting  instinct  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
word  is  not  useful,  in  fact  it  would  go  very 
badly  with  a  man  who  had  the  fighting  in- 
stinct. If  a  man  goes  around  fighting  every- 
body he  does  not  last  long.  In  the  Far  West, 
just  before  the  Vigilante  days,  there  was  just 
one  moment,  so  to  speak,  in  the  world's  his- 
tory when  the  real  fighting  man  prospered. 
Some  of  those  early  desperadoes,  like  Boone, 
Helm  and  Henrv^  Plummer,  lasted  a  long  time. 
They  killed  many  a  good  man,  but  sooner  or 
later  the  Vigilantes  *'got"  them  all;  the  law- 
abiding  element  grew  and  the  outlaw  element 
declined;  and  soon  the  early  days  in  the  Far 
West  became  a  closed  chapter,  and  a  chapter 
that  we  can  now  see  was  unique.  I  think  it  is 


INTRODUCTORY  19 

safe  to  say  that  there  never  was  before  in  the 
whole  written  history  of  the  world  any  time 
like  that  in  the  early  West,  when  a  man  could 
walk  about  killing  people,  and  keep  it  up. 
Such  a  social  order,  or  rather  disorder,  shows 
us  by  its  own  qualities  how  wonderfully 
free  from  fighting  and  killing  ordinary  daily 
human  intercourse  is.  Let  us  picture  to  our 
minds  the  life  in  the  early  cities  of  antiq- 
uity, —  Thebes,  Babylon,  and  Tyre,  and  the 
smaller  communities  as  well.  We  can  conceive 
of  these  people  quarreling  much,  but  not  of  a 
man  single-handed  holding  up  the  town.  Nor 
can  we  suppose  that  there  was  much  killing 
within  any  one  town  or  city;  not  indiscrimi- 
nate killing  right  and  left  by  individuals;  only 
organized  killing  by  groups  and  factions.  The 
most  primitive  and  savage  society  shows  the 
same  thing;  there  is  much  killing  of  one  tribe 
by  its  neighbor  tribe,  but  a  man  who  killed 
within  his  own  tribe  would  certainly  become 
unpopular.  In  days  of  old  in  sparsely  settled 
regions  the  highwayman  flourished;  but  that 
is  exactly  my  point,  that  it  is  the  group  forma- 
tion of  men  that  necessitates  the  life  of  peace- 
ful citizenship.  The  natures  that  have  not 
been  willing  to  adapt  themselves  to  the  en- 
vironment of  groups  have  been  weeded  out. 
The  quarrelsome  types  have  tended  to  dis- 
appear.   Throughout  all  the  ages,  and  for 


20  IS  WAR  DBnXISHING? 

about  half  the  time,  groups  have  fought 
against  other  groups.  That  is  the  reason  why 
the  war  instinct,  in  contradistinction  to  the 
fighting  instinct,  has  taken  a  different  course. 
There  has  been  little  if  any  natural  selection 
tending  to  eliminate  the  war  instinct.  It  has 
been  useful  for  obvious  reasons. 

No  natural  groups  of  men  could  have  been 
evolved  without  the  gregarious  warring  in- 
stinct, since  the  groups  that  were  relatively 
deficient  in  the  qualities  that  hold  men  to- 
gether would  be  just  the  ones  that  would  as 
a  group  crumble  away.  Hence  some  groups 
must  from  time  to  time  be  growing  and 
strengthening  themselves  at  the  expense  of 
others.  Some  survived  groups  are  always 
present,  and  may  be  regarded  as  living 
entities  endeavoring  to  preserve  their  form. 
They  are  to  a  certain  extent  natural,  to  a 
certain  extent  artificial.  That  is  to  say,  they 
in  part  depend  on  racial  similarities,  but  also 
to  a  great  extent  on  political  accidents  chang- 
ing with  the  oft -shifting  outline  of  the  politi- 
cal frontiers.  These  groups  should  never  be 
thought  of  as  absolutely  definite  entities  with 
clearly  cut  outlines,  —  not  like  animal  spe- 
cies; but  rather  should  be  thought  of  as 
varieties  and  sub-varieties  with  vague  geo- 
graphical boundaries  and  more  or  less  of  a 
tendency  to  hold  together  as  a  unit.  They  are 


INTRODUCTORY  21 

much  more  liable  than  are  animal  varieties 
to  sudden  splittings  and  rearrangements,  so 
that  the  history  of  European  warfare  pre- 
sents, in  the  ever-changing  alliances,  a  kalei- 
doscopic picture. 

The  natural  enemies  of  any  group  are  its 
nearest  surrounding  groups,  but  some  of  these 
may  be,  for  the  time  being,  its  friends  and 
allies;  it  all  depends  on  the  exigencies  of  the 
political  situation. 

The  result  of  it  all  is  that  to-day,  or  at  any 
day  up  to  the  present,  practically  every  young 
or  middle-aged  man  is  ready  to  respond  to 
the  call  for  arms  when  the  gregarious  fighting 
instinct  is  stimulated.  It  is  essentially  a  gre- 
garious instinct;  therefore,  only  after  many 
persons  are  already  affected  is  its  full  force 
felt.  That  is  also  why,  in  the  initiative  stages 
of  the  ebullition,  the  action  of  a  compara- 
tively small  number  of  persons  counts  for  so 
much,  if  they  in  any  way  exercise  a  practi- 
cal control  or  leadership.  The  instinct  is 
there,  simply  because  it  is  an  instinct,  and 
therefore  like  all  instincts  inherited  in  the 
germ-plasm  of  the  race.  It  matters  not 
whether  a  man's  immediate  ancestors  did  or 
did  not  actually  take  part  in  warfare.  The 
reason  why  it  makes  no  difference  is  because 
acquired  traits  are  not  inherited:  that  is,  if 
they   are   acquired   from   the   environment. 


22  IS  WAR  DEVimiSHING? 

acquired  from  education  or  practice.  Biol- 
ogists are  in  almost  universal  accord  on  this 
point.  Therefore,  as  is  often  the  case  in  the 
history  of  man,  one  whole  generation  of  a 
race  lives  through  maturity  and  dies  never 
experiencing  war,  but  the  war  instinct  is  not 
the  least  lessened  thereby. 

If  these  human  problems  are  to  be  treated 
scientifically,  they  must  be  tested  in  the  ob- 
jective spirit  of  inquiry.  The  first  need  in 
science,  at  least  in  inductive  science,  is  to 
collect  the  facts.  We  must  first  collect  all 
possible  facts  about  war.  Next  we  must  an- 
alyze and  classify  these  facts.  This  will  lead 
to  some  understanding  as  to  (a)  causes  of 
war;  (6)  results  of  war.  Among  the  causes  of 
war  we  may  provisionally  postulate  racial, 
economic,  religious,  and  personal  causes. 
Among  the  results  we  must  try  to  weigh  not 
only  the  evils,  but  also  the  possible  benefits, 
the  intellectual  and  moral  as  well  as  the 
political  and  economic  effects,  the  aftermaths 
of  war  and  their  relations  to  industrial,  com- 
mercial, literary,  and  artistic  activity.  In 
weighing  all  these  results  of  war,  distinctions 
must  be  made  between  successful  and  unsuc- 
cessful war,  for  it  is  highly  improbable  that 
the  effects  can  be  the  same  on  the  nations 
that  win  as  on  the  nations  that  lose. 


INTRODUCTORY  93 

Then,  again,  the  interests  of  certain  por- 
tions of  the  nation  are  not  identical  with  the 
interests  of  the  nation  as  a  whole.  For  in- 
stance, a  successful  war  waged  in  a  foreign 
country  may  not  benefit  the  rank  and  file 
among  the  conquerors,  but  the  officers  and 
the  families  of  the  officers  and  the  governing 
classes  in  general  may  as  a  caste  profit  much 
in  the  extension  of  wealth  and  power. 

Another  obscure  question  —  one  that  has 
been  much  discussed  and  but  little  studied  — 
is  the  relationship  of  war  to  eugenics.  What 
is  the  selective  survival  of  war  and  its  influ- 
ence on  the  race  and  on  the  evolution  of  man- 
kind.^ This  selection  must  have  its  good  side 
as  well  as  its  bad.  The  evils  are  obvious  and 
have  been  much  exploited.  "The  removal  by 
war  of  the  strongest  and  the  leaving  at  home 
of  the  weakest  to  propagate  the  race  is  bound 
to  have  as  result  a  physical  deterioration  of 
the  population  concerned."  On  the  other 
hand,  critics  have  contended  that  the  great 
mortality  in  war  is  really  of  advantage  to  the 
race,  because,  within  the  army  itself,  those 
who  can  survive  hardship  and  disease  must  be 
by  nature  stronger  than  those  who  succumb. 

Also  in  modern  warfare  cunning  and  re- 
sourcefulness count  for  a  great  deal.  It  seems 
highly  probable  that  more  than  ever  before 
superiority  in  intelligence  is  a  great  asset 


94  IS  WAR  DEMINISHING? 

among  fighting  men.  The  way  this  works  out 
in  relation  to  survival  of  the  fittest  is  curi- 
ously interesting.  It  must  be  admitted  that 
among  all  the  millions  who  to-day  are  firing 
at  each  other  either  shells  or  bullets,  the  men 
jvho  are  the  most  accurate  with  gim  or  rifle 
are,  other  things  equal,  doing  the  most  killing. 
Other  things  are,  of  course,  not  equal.  Suc- 
cess depends  on  various  factors,  —  amount 
of  ammunition,  rapidity  of  transport,  good 
leadership,  etc.,  etc.,  —  but  the  fact  remains 
that  in  spite  of  it  all  the  best  shots  are  killing 
more  people  than  the  poor  shots  are.  Then  it 
follows  that  the  best  shots  are  themselves  less 
often  killed  than  are  the  poor  shots,  after  any 
interval  of  time.  To  make  this  clear  it  is 
perhaps  necessary  to  imagine  an  extreme  in- 
stance. Suppose  two  opposed  trenches  con- 
tain one  hundred  men  each.  Let  one  trench 
be  supposed  to  be  filled  with  extraordinarily 
good  shots,  the  other  with  extremely  poor 
ones.  Then,  after  an  interval  of  time  nearly 
all  the  men  in  the  trench  of  poor  shots  would 
have  been  hit  while  only  a  very  few  among 
the  good  shots  would  have  been  hit.  The 
same  principle  holds,  no  matter  how  the  men 
are  distributed,  that  the  best  shots  will  be 
themselves  least  often  struck.  It  does  not 
occur  to  the  individual  soldier  to  think  of  his 
chances  of  survival  through  the  war  being  en- 


INTRODUCTORY  25 

hanced  by  the  fact  that  he  is  a  good  shot. 
That  is  because  so  many  other  factors  enter 
in  that  mean  more  to  him  personally.  It 
makes  a  great  difference  to  his  chances  per- 
sonally where  he  happens  to  be  sent.  He  may 
very  likely  be  killed  by  shrapnel  or  by  a  bay- 
onet. But  on  the  average  for  all  the  soldiers 
on  both  sides  this  factor  counts  toward  the 
selection  for  survival  of  a  certain  kind  of 
superiority.  It  is  highly  improbable  that  su- 
periority in  handling  modern  weapons  is  not 
correlated  with  general  mental  superiority. 

So  it  is  with  other  forms  of  killing.  If  it  be 
admitted  that  intelligence  is  a  factor  at  all, 
then  the  more  intelligent  must  themselves 
tend  to  escape  from  the  mere  fact  that  they 
tend  to  do  more  of  the  killing.  If  strength  and 
intelligence  are  of  any  value  in  a  bayonet 
charge,  then  just  so  far  as  they  tend  to  the 
killing  of  opponents  so  they  must  tend  to  the 
survival  of  their  possessors.  With  artillery, 
indirect  fire,  telephones,  wireless,  and  modern 
machine  guns,  intelligence  must  count  for  a 
good  deal  in  the  successful  destruction  of  the 
enemy.  Then  it  counts  that  much  toward  the 
survival  of  those  who  do  the  destroying. 

Another  matter  that  is  very  often  men- 
tioned is  the  percentage  of  officers  to  men 
among  the  killed  and  wounded.  Returns 
usually  show  a  regrettable  disproportion  of 


26  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

officers  among  the  casualties.  This  is  said  to 
lower  the  average  quality  of  the  blood  of  the 
nation.  It  does,  of  course,  lower  the  average, 
but  it  must  be  remembered  that,  as  a  ques- 
tion purely  of  the  evolution  of  man,  man  has 
not  evolved  essentially  by  a  raising  of  the 
average.  It  is  the  rise  in  the  intelligence  of  a 
very  small  percentage  of  all  mankind  that  has 
been  the  feature  in  the  growth  of  civilization. 
It  has  always  been  the  same  in  all  organic 
evolution.  The  world  to-day  is  farther  ad- 
vanced in  evolution  than  it  was  in  the  Car- 
boniferous Age,  not  because  the  average  of 
all  types  of  life  is  higher,  but  because  some  of 
the  types  are  higher.  Some  may  have  sunk 
even  lower  in  the  scale  of  life.  It  is  the  same 
in  the  evolution  of  the  mammals,  and  the 
appearance  of  man  among  the  mammals. 
Great  things  have  happened,  not  because  all 
the  mammals  progressed,  but  because  one  out 
of  a  very  great  number  progressed.  If  the 
officers  constitute  one  per  cent  and  the  sol- 
diers ninety-nine  per  cent,  the  officers  might 
be  reduced  to  three  quarters  of  one  per  cent. 
There  would  be  a  loss  in  the  average  of  the 
whole,  but  the  three  quarters  that  remained 
among  the  officers  might  by  selection  be 
superior  on  the  average  to  the  one  per  cent 
there  at  the  start.  ^ 

^  If  anything  does  bring  this  about,  and  it  is  quite  conceivable 
that  a  selection  for  superiority  does  take  place,  then  warfare  causes 


INTRODUCTORY  27 

In  whatever  light  we  may  view  all  these 
difficult  questions,  the  great  fact  remains 
that  somehow  man  has  evolved,  and  he  has 
fought,  presumably  half  of  the  time.  If  war- 
fare is  so  deleterious  it  may  be  asked,  —  How 
did  he  get  where  he  is?  We  have  thus  seen 
how  difficult  and  complicated  is  the  philosophy 
of  war.  Yet  most  writers  have  been  content 
to  take  one  side  or  the  other  of  the  issue,  so 
that  we  have  scarcely  begun  to  have  a  science 
of  the  subject.  With  the  hope  that  some  day 
this  tremendously  important  problem  may  be 
better  understood,  let  us  examine  and  discuss 
a  few  primary  facts. 

not  a  deterioration,  but  a  differentiation.  The  oflScer  caste  tends  to 
be  smaller  in  proportion  to  the  common  soldier  caste,  but  it  tends 
to  be  biologically  farther  and  farther  removed  from  it  and  more  and 
more  above  it.  This  is  precisely  what  evolution  is,  —  a  constant 
making  of  greater  and  greater  differences  in  races,  varieties,  and 
species.  This  is  also  just  what  has  taken  place  in  Europe  for  hun- 
dreds of  years,  coincidently  with  the  formation  of  social  and  family 
differences,  and  finally  the  formation  of  a  gentry,  nobility,  and  roy- 
alty on  the  average  superior  in  military  ability  to  the  commoner.  It 
is  here  at  this  point  immediately  thought  by  those  unacquainted 
with  the  subject  that  nobility  and  royalty  are  not  superior  in 
natural  ability,  and  if  they  become  distinguished  as  soldiers  it  is 
because  they  are  the  only  ones  that  are  given  any  chance.  If  such 
were  the  truth  of  the  matter,  if  the  higher  caste  fell  short  in  mihtary 
ability,  it  would,  of  course,  upset  the  whole  idea  that  I  am  here 
bringing  forward.  But  it  is  with  certainty,  or  at  least  with  the 
highest  degree  of  probability,  we  may  assert  that  these  higher  castes 
do  meet  the  tests;  and  on  the  average,  whatever  the  exceptions  may 
be,  the  higher  the  caste  the  greater  the  percentage  of  successful 
soldiers.  The  proof  for  this  assertion  and  that  it  is  due  to  heredity 
cannot  possibly  be  given  here.  It  would  cover  many  pages.  Those 
interested  may  be  referred  to  chapter  xvii  of  The  Influence  of  Mon- 
archs.  (Macmillan,  1913.) 


n 

IS   WAR   DIMINISHING? 

Let  us  turn  at  once  to  the  most  generalized 
of  our  results,  the  grand  averages  as  they  are 
tabulated  on  Chart  D  by  half -century  peri- 
ods from  A.D.  1450  to  the  present  day.  The 
impression  is  in  a  moment  obtained  that  cer- 
tainly there  is  a  falling-off  in  war.  The  lines 
slope  downward  like  the  sides  of  a  great 
mountain  chain.  It  is  not  a  continuous  fall, 
but  the  lines  on  the  right  are  on  a  noticeably 
lower  level  than  on  the  left.  These  lines  mark 
off  the  percentages  of  war  years  by  periods  of 
fifty  years  each.  Following  the  central  line  or 
average  of  the  other  two,  we  see  it  rising  from 
1450  to  1600,  when  it  starts  down  very  rapidly 
to  1750-1800  and  rising  again  for  1800-1850. 
From  55  per  cent,  the  grand  average  rises  to 
71  per  cent,  falls  to  28  per  cent,  rises  to  35  per 
cent,  and  falls  to  22  per  cent,  the  last  half- 
century  being  the  lowest  of  all. 

If  this  chart  were  for  the  entire  history  of 
Europe  from  the  earliest  records  to  the 
present  day  it  would  be  very  satisfactory  and 
conclusive.  It  would  then  seem  that  the 
time  devoted  to  organized  warfare  had  risen 
with  the  development  of  large  national  units 


IS  WAK  DIMINISHING?  29 

and  had  declined  with  the  advance  of  civiliza- 
tion. If  our  great  peak  were,  say,  the  fifth 
century,  and  our  lesser  peak  on  the  right  were 
the  period  of  the  Reformation,  then  again  it 
would  be  very  significant.  But  the  chart  as  it 
actually  stands  does  not  do  more  than  throw 
a  moderate  amount  of  probability  in  favor 
of  declining  war  years.  That  is  because  its 
range  of  time  is  not  long  enough.  We  would 
like  very  much  to  see  the  percentages  for 
the  centuries  prior  to  the  fifteenth.  If  these 
should  be  found  to  be  as  high  as  or  higher 
than  the  period  1450-1700,  it  would  be  in- 
dicative that  the  drop  from  1700  to  1900 
presaged  a  new  movement  in  humanity's 
evolution  and  not  a  minor  wave  in  the  long 
roll  of  the  ages.  European  war  years  have 
been  diminishing  for  two  centuries,  but  it 
must  be  remembered  that  while  two  hundred 
years  seem  a  long  time,  two  hundred  years 
are  as  a  few  moments  in  the  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  years  that  mankind  has  been  on  this 
planet.  Even  if  man  has  existed  only  one 
hundred  thousand  years  (which  is  a  low  esti- 
mate), if  the  whole  chart  is  a  foot  wide,  then 
two  centuries  make  the  space  between  one 
thirty-second  and  one  sixty-fourth  of  an  inch. 
And  it  is  with  the  psychology  of  war,  human 
instincts  and  elemental  passions  that  our 
problem  is  bound  up.   If  a  year  of  research 


30  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

will  enable  one  to  examine  about  one  thirty- 
second  of  an  inch  of  the  curve  of  war,  or  about 
one  fifth  of  one  per  cent  of  one  particular  side 
of  the  whole  problem,  how  much  chance  have 
the  superficial  philosophers  of  war  who  are 
so  freely  expressing  themselves,  of  doing  any- 
thing more  than  satisfying  their  own  sub- 
jective emotions,  of  making  a  little  money, 
and  getting  their  pictures  in  the  newspapers. 
Some  might  say  that  since  the  inductive 
method  has  only  given  one  thirty-second  of 
an  inch  out  of  a  foot,  the  deductive  method  is 
the  only  one  that  has  any  chance.  But  my 
reply  is  that  the  arguers  have  not  got  any- 
where; that  the  little  portion  of  the  curve  that 
I  have  examined  is  found  declining;  and  fur- 
thermore, I  should  hope  that  some  one  will 
work  in  other  regions  of  history  and  report  on 
other  dates. 

This  curve  on  Chart  D  may  be  looked  at 
from  another  point  of  view,  which  shows  that 
it  is  probable  that  war  years  are  declining, 
but  not  at  all  certain.  K  we  divide  the  whole 
line  into  parts  of  about  the  same  length  as 
the  small  rising  line  1750-1850,  we  then  get 
approximately  eight  parts,  three  of  which  are 
ascending  (+)  and  five  of  which  are  descend- 
ing ( — ).  These  are,  in  the  order  from  left  to 
right:  +,  -|-,  — ,  — ,  — ,  — ,  +,  — .  Anybody 
knows  that  a  coin  might  fall  head,  head,  tail. 


IS  WAR  DIMINISHING?  31 

tail,  tail,  tail,  head,  tail,  without  awakening 
curiosity  or  comment.  But  ours  is  not  as 
meaningless  a  case  as  that.  Our  figures  do 
have  some  significance,  since  the  "pluses" 
are  more  to  the  left  and  the  *' minuses"  are 
more  to  the  right.  Also  the  "minuses"  ex- 
ceed the  "pluses"  5  to  3. 

The  next  question  is,  —  In  what  types  of 
nations  has  this  decline  been  the  greatest? 
On  Chart  D  the  five  strong  powers,  Eng- 
land, France,  Prussia,  Russia,  and  Austria,  are 
separated  from  the  five  lesser  powers,  Tur- 
key, Spain,  Holland,  Denmark,  and  Sweden. 
There  it  can  be  seen  that  it  is  the  stronger 
nations  since  1700  that  have  devoted  the  most 
time  to  war.  Moreover,  the  lesser  nations 
were  once  the  great  powers.  Spain,  Turkey, 
Holland,  and  Sweden  were  active  in  warfare 
at  the  same  period  that  they  were  politically 
great. 

A  study  of  Chart  B  does  not  make  one  feel 
that  the  vigorous  countries  have  notably  re- 
nounced trial  by  force.  The  lines  for  Eng- 
land, France,  and  Russia  would  never  suggest 
that  militarism  is  ceasing.  All  show  abrupt 
fluctuations,  but  no  tendency  in  one  direction 
more  than  another.  Austria  gives  a  striking 
decline,  but  Austria  is  certainly  not  to-day 
in  the  same  position  of  importance  relatively 
to  other  nations  that  she  was  in  the  sixteenth 


32  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

century,  when  we  find  her  fighting  eighty  per 
cent  of  the  time. 

Prussia  alone,  among  the  expanding  na- 
tionahties,  exhibits  a  dechne  in  war  years. 
Yet  it  cannot  be  readily  believed  that  modern 
Prussia  has  set  a  shining  example  of  pacific 
policy.  Her  methods  have  been  aggressive; 
her  wars  swift  and  important.  The  time  ele- 
ment is  not  the  only  aspect  of  the  philosophy 
of  war,  although  in  this  research  it  is  our  chief 
concern.  So  much,  then,  for  the  broader  con- 
clusions warranted  by  our  dates  of  war  and 
peace. 

It  seems  worth  while  also  to  analyze  the 
history  of  each  country  by  itself,  to  comment 
on  special  characteristics  and  to  indicate 
some  special  directions  that  would  seem  to  re- 
pay further  research.  Especially  interesting 
is  the  relationship  between  war  and  national 
progress,  territorial  and  other  materialistic 
progress,  gains  and  losses  on  the  economic  bal- 
ance-sheet, religious  and  intellectual  awaken- 
ings, artistic  and  literary  revivals,  all  of  which 
doubtless  have  some  correlation  with  war 
either  negative  or  positive.  It  remains  for  the 
future  to  disclose  these  grand  interactions. 
We  can  at  present  do  little  more  than  mention 
a  few  salient  facts  as  they  seem  to  relate  to 
the  causes  and  eflFects  of  warfare. 


Ill 

AUSTRIA   AND   THE  HAPSBURGS  * 

Austria's  career  as  a  fighting  power  reached 
its  apogee  in  the  West  in  the  Thirty  Years' 
War  (1618-48).  Since  then  a  steady  decline 
in  the  amount  of  war  has  gone  on,  and  this 
despite  the  participation  of  the  Monarchy 
in  practically  every  great  European  struggle 
until  the  middle  of  the  last  century. 

The  first  two  centuries  after  1450  were 
filled  with  an  enormous  number  of  wars  in  the 
Austrian  dominions,  especially  in  her  eastern 
provinces,  where  Hungarian  and  Turk  were 
almost  equally  her  foes.  Those  were  the  days 
of  the  Huniadi  in  Hungary,  men  whose  scab- 
bards rusted,  but  their  swords  never.  Mat- 
thias Corvin  Huniadi  followed  his  father, 
John,  and  in  turn  was  succeeded  by  the  two 
Zapolyas,  who  ruled  part  of  Hungary  during 
most  of  the  sixteenth  century.  The  Huniadi 
fought  with  the  Emperor  frequently;  the 
Zapolyas  even  leagued  themselves  with  the 
Turk  against  him.  A  triangular  struggle 
thus  developed,  which  was  carried  on  by 
other  Hungarian  and  Transylvanian  chief- 
tains, the  Bathorys  and  Rakoczys  in  Tran- 

^  The  analysis  of  the  nations  is  arranged  alphabetically. 


34 


IS  WAR  DBIINISHING? 


sylvania  and  Bethlen  Gabor  and  the  Toekleys 
in  Hungar^^  proper.  Such  were  the  relations 
of  Austria,  Hungary,  and  Turkey  until  the 
Peace  of  Passarowitz  in  1718. 

In  Bohemia,  Austria  had  another  annoying 
problem.  In  14o0,  Bohemia  had  just  emerged 
from  the  Hussite  Wars.  George  Podiebrad 
stirred  the  embers  up  again,  engaging  in  war 
with  Matthias  Corvin  Huniadi,  as  well  as 
viiih  the  Emperor,  and  after  his  death  in  1471 
the  same  state  of  affairs  went  on  until  the 
crushing  blow  of  the  TMiite  Mountain  in  1620 
ended  Bohemia's  separate  existence. 

The  figures  below  show  the  total  number 
of  years  in  which  Austria  was  engaged  in  war, 
divided  into  fifty  and  hundred  year  periods 
beginning  in  1450  and  ending  in  the  year 
1900. 


1450 


1500 


1600 


1700 


1800 


1900 


37 


36 


39.5 


40.5 


33 


29 


19.5 


7.5 


rs.o 


48.5 


13.5 


From  1600  to  1650  there  were  40.5  years  of 
warfare,  or  81  per  cent.  The  fall  from  that 
time  to  1900  can  be  seen  to  be  very  rapid  and 
continuous.  It  is  a  remarkable  decline  and 
is  paralleled  only  by  Prussia. 


AUSTRIA  AND  THE  HAPSBURGS       35 

Austria,  1450-1914 
Regency,  1439-1457 

1446-1453.  The  Emperor  at  odds  with  the  nobility  of  Hungary  and 

Bohemia. 
1454-1456.  Raid  of  Mahomet  II  of    Turkey.    Hostilities    ended 

without  treaty. 

Frederick  III  and  Albert,  1457-1463 

1461-1463.  The  Emperor  at  war  with  other  Hapsburgs  in  Austria. 
1462.  Matthias  Corvin  Huniadi. 

1462.  Podiebrad  of  Bohemia,  at  war  with  North    German 
States. 

Frederick  III,  1463-1493 

1463-1464.  Huniadi  at  war  with  the  Sultan  of  Turkey. 

1468.  Frederick  Ill's  invasion  of  rebellious  Bohemia. 
1468-1469.  Huniadi  of  Hungary,  Catholic  champion  against  Podie- 
brad of  Bohemia. 
1469-1480.  Turkey. 

1470.  Bohemia  at  war  with  Hungary  again. 
1471-1478.  Continuation  of  semi-Hussite  war  between  Bohemia  and 

Hungary. 
1477-1478.  Emperor  at  war  with  Hungary. 

1478.  Bauernkrieg  in  Karinthia. 
1480-1491.   Emperor  against  Hungary,  ended  by  Peace  of  Press- 
burg. 
1482-1483.  Hungarian  aggressions  against  the  Turks. 
1490-1495.  Hungary  at  war  with  Turkey. 

Maximilian  I,  1493-1519 

1495.  France.  League  against  Charles  VIII. 
1496-1497.  France. 

1499.  Swiss  Confederation,  ended  by  Peace  of  Basel. 
1499-1502.  Leagued  with  Venice  and  Pope,  against  Turkey.  ' 
1508-1513.  Venice.  League  of  Cambrai. 
1512-1519.  Turkey;  ended  by  three  years'  truce. 
1512-1514.  France,    Emperor    leagued    with    Pope    and    "Holy 

League." 
1513-1518.  Venice;  ended  by  a  truce. 

1514.  Bauernkrieg  in  Hungary. 

1515.  Bauernkrieg  in  Austria. 


36  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

Charles  V,  1519-1521 

Ferdinand  I,  1521-1564 

1521-1531.  Turkey  and  Zapolya  of  Hungary. 
1521-1526.  France;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Madrid. 
1522-1523.  Knights'  War.   Rebellion  of  Sickengen,  etc. 
1524-1526.  Bauemkrieg  in  Sachsen,  etc. 
1526-1529.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Cambrai. 
1532-1534.  Turkey  and  Zapolya  of  Hungary. 

1534.  War  in  Wiirttemberg  against  Philip  of  Hesse,  etc. 

1535.  Charles  V's  expedition  agaiust  Tunis. 
1536-1538.  France;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Nice. 
1537-1540.  Revolt  of  Ghent. 

1537-1538.  Zapolya  of  Hungary;  ended  by  Peace  of  Grosswardein. 
1537-1547.  Turkey;  ended  by  a  five  years'  truce. 

1541.  Charles  V's  unsuccessful  expedition  against  Algiers. 
1542-1544.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Crepy. 
1546-1547.  Schmalkaldic  League.  Battle  of  Miihlberg. 
1551-1562.  Turkey;  ended  by  a  seven  years'  truce. 

1552.  War  vnih  Maurice  of  Sachsen;  ended  by  Convention  of 
Passau. 
1552-1556.  France;  ended  by  Truce  of  Vaucelles. 

Maximilian  II,  1564-1576 

1565-1568.  Turkey;  ended  by  Peace  of  Adrianople,  which  was  re- 
newed. 


Rudolph  II,  1576-1612 

1575-1593.  Partisan  warfare  in  Hungary  against  the  Turks. 
1587-1588.  Poland,  in  support  of  Maximilian's  claim  to  throne. 
1593-1606.  Turkey;  ended  by  Peace  of  Zsitva-Mundung. 

Matthias,  1612-1619 

1611-1612.  Bathory  of  Transylvania. 
1614-1615.  Bethlen  Gabor  of  Hungary. 
1615-1618.  Venice;  ended  by  Peace  of  Madrid. 


Ferdinand  II,  1619-1637 
Ferdinand  III,  1637-1657 
1618-1648.  Thirty  Years'  War;  ended  by  Peace  of  Westphalia. 


AUSTRIA  AND  THE  HAPSBURGS       37 

Leopold  Z,  1657-1705 

1657-1662.  Rakoczy,  of  Hungary,  at  war  with  Poland  and  Turkey. 
1657-1660.  The  Emperor,  ally  of  Poland,  at  war  with  Sweden  and 

allies. 
1661-1664.  Turkey;  ended  by  twenty  years'  truce  at  Temeswaer. 
1670-1671.  Rebellion  against  Hapsburgs  in  Hungary  led  by  Toekely. 
1673-1679.  France,  ended  by  Peace  of  Nijmwegen. 
1675-1679.  Sweden. 
1676-1687.  Hungarian  rebellion,  led  by  Emerich  Toekely. 

1680.  Rebellion  of  Bohemian  peasantry. 
1682-1699.  Turkey;  ended  by  Peace  of  Carlowitz. 
1688-1697.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Ryswick. 

Josevh  7,  1705-1711 

1701-1714.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Rastadt. 
1701-1711.  Revolt  of  Francis  Rakoczy  II;  ended  by  Treaty  of 
Szothmar. 

Charles  FZ,  1711-1740 

1716-1718.  Turkey;  ended  by  Peace  of  Passarowitz. 
1718-1720.  Spain.  War  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance. 
1733-1735.  France  and  Poland.  War  of  the  Polish  Succession. 
1737-1739.  Turkey;  ended  by  Peace  of  Belgrade. 

Maria  Theresa,  1740-1780 

1740-1748.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle. 
1740-1742.  Prussia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Breslau.  First  Silesian  War. 
1744-1745.  Prussia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Dresden.    Second  Silesian 

War. 
1756-1763.  Prussia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Hubertsburg.  Third  Silesian 

War. 
1778-1779.  Prussia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Teschen,  mediated  by  Russia. 

Joseph  II,  1780-1790 

1787-1791.  Turkey;  ended  by  Peace  of  Sistova. 
1787-1790.  Revolt  in  Belgian  provinces,  especially  Brabant. 

Leopold  II,  1790-1792 

Francis  II,  1792-1835  . 

1792-1797.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Campo  Formio.  First  Coali- 
tion. 
1798-1801.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Luneville.  Second  Coalition. 


38  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

1805.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Pressburg.  Third  Coalition. 

1809.  France;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Schonbrunn. 

1809.  Russia. 

1812-1813.  Russia. 

1813-1814.  France;  ended  by  First  Treaty  of  Paris. 

1815.  France.  Les  Cent  Jours. 

1815.  Naples;  ended  by  flight  of  Murat. 

1821.  Intervention  in  Naples  and  Sardinia. 

1831-1832.  Risings  in  Modena,  Parma,  and  the  Romagna. 

Ferdinand  /,  1835-1848 

1840.  Intervention  in  Egyptian  imbroglio. 
1846.  Risings  in  Galicia  and  Cracow,  put  down  by  the  powers. 
1848.  Second  Vienna  insurrection;  ended  by  capture  of  Vienna 
by  Windischgratz. 

Francis  Joseph,  1848  - 

1848-1849.  Sardinia.  Campaign  of  Novara. 

1848-1849.  Hungarian  insurrection,   put  down  by  Russians   at 
Villagos. 
1848.  Denmark.   Austria  took  part  as  member  of  Germanic 

Confederation. 
1859.  France  and  Sardinia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Zurich. 
'  1864.  Denmark,  Austria  the  ally  of  Prussia.  Peace  of  Vienna. 
1866.  Prussia,  ended  by  Peace  of  Prag.   The  Seven  Weeks' 
War. 
1869-1870.  Rising  in  Dalmatia. 

1878-1879.  Occupation  of  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina. 
1881-1882.  Risings   in   the   Herzegovina,    Bosnia,  and   Southern 

Dalmatia. 
1897-1898.  Intervention  in  Crete.  . 
1914-        .  Servia,  Russia,  France,  England,  Belgium,  Japan,  Italy. 


IV 

DENMARK 

Denmark  is  the  only  country  that  never  gives 
as  much  as  fifty  per  cent  of  war  years  during 
any  half -century.  It  has  been  the  most  peace- 
ful of  all  the  nations,  and  hence  we  have 
the  suggestion  that  a  more  profound  study 
than  is  usually  accorded  to  the  history  of 
Denmark  would  be  well  worth  while.  The 
figures  in  half -centuries  show  a  fair  improve- 
ment with  the  course  of  time.  Below  are 
seen  the  years  of  war  in  each  half -century  and 
in  each  century. 


.1500 

1600 

17 

00 

18 

00 

m 

1  15.5 

22.5 

.0 

21.5 

9 

11 

1 

10 

^      1 

32.5 

30.5 

12 

15      I 

Denmark  was  once  a  great  and  powerful 
nation,  but  that  was  back  in  the  fourteenth 
century,  in  the  days  of  Valdemar  III  and  the 
great  Queen  Margaret,  anterior  to  the  com- 
mencement of  our  own  dates.  Subsequent  to 
1450,  Denmark  has  never  been  more  than  a 
small  and  unimportant  unit  from  the  geo- 
graphical or  political  point  of  view.  There 
has  existed,  for  most  of  the  time,  a  good  share 
of  general  prosperity  in  Denmark,  a  good 


40  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

average  intelligence,  and  a  widely  diffused 
wealth  among  the  middle  classes,  —  not  much 
poverty  and  not  many  very  rich  people. 
Denmark's  history  presents  many  long  peri- 
ods of  peace.  There  was  one  such  of  fifty-two 
years  in  the  seventeenth  century  from  1720 
to  1772. 

Denmark,  1450-1914 
Christian  I,  1448-1481 

1451-1457.  War  in  Scania  against  Karl  Knutson. 
1459-1460.  Raids  in  Holstein. 

1463.  Expedition  against  Russia. 
1463-1465.  Sweden,  in  Scania. 
1467-1471.  War  in  Scania  against  Swedes. 

JoAn,  1481-1513" 

1495-1497.  War  for  the  Swedish  Crown. 

1500.  War  in  Ditmarsh. 
1501-1513.  Sweden. 

1502-1506.  Norway,  the  ally  of  Sweden. 
1508-1512.  Norway. 

1512.  Lubeck  and  the  Hansa. 

Christian  II,  1513-1523 

1516-1520.  Sweden.   Conquest  of  Sweden  by  Danes.^ 
1521-1524.  Swedish  revolt  against  Danes  under  Gustavus  Vasa. 

Frederick  7,  1523-1533 

1522-1525.  Revolt  in  Denmark. 
1531-1532.  Civil  war. 

Interregnum,  1533-1534 
1534.  Revolt  in  Jutland. 

Christian  III,  1534-1559 
1535-1536.  War  in  Fionia  and  with  Lubeck. 


DENMARK  41 

Frederick  II,  1559-1588 

1559.  Conquest  of  Ditmarsh. 
1561-1570.  Russia.  First  Great  Northern  War. 
1563-1570.  Sweden.  First  Great  Northern  War. 

Regency,  1588-1596 

Christian  IV,  1596-1648 

1600-1611.  Sweden.  War  of  Kalmar. 

1616-1618.  Sweden.  War  of  Kalmar. 

1620-1622.  Sweden.  War  of  Kalmar. 

1625-1626.  Sweden.  War  of  Kalmar. 

1625-1629.  Empire.  Thirty  Years'  War;  ended  by  Peace  of  Lubeck. 

1626-1628.  Sweden.  War  of  Kalmar. 

1628-1629.  Sweden.  End  of  War  of  Kalmar  by  Truce  of  Altmark. 

1630.  Hamburg. 

1638.  Destruction  of  Polish  fleet  near  Dantzig. 

1643.  Hamburg. 

1643-1645.  Sweden. 

Fredenck  III,  1648-1670 

1657-1658.  Sweden;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Roeskilde. 
1658-1660.  Sweden;  ended  by  Peace  of  Copenhagen. 
1666-1667.  England;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Breda. 

Christian  V,  1670-1699 

1675-1679.  Sweden  and  France;  ended  by  treaties  of  Lund  and 

Fontainebleau. 
1676-1679.  Hamburg. 
1686.  Hamburg. 

Fredenck  IV,  1699-1730 

1699-1700.  Sweden,  ended  by  Treaty  of  Travendal. 

1700.  Prince  of  Gottorp. 
1709-1720.  Sweden.  Second  participation  in  Third  Great  Northern 
War. 

Christian  VI,  1730-1746 
Frederick  V,  1746-1766 
Christian  VII,  1766-1784 
1772.  Overthrow  of  Stuensee. 


42  IS  WAR  DEVIINISHING? 

Frederick  FZ,  1784-1839 

1788.  Sweden. 

1801.  England. 
1807-1814.  England.  Danes  in  alliance  with  Napoleon. 
1808-1809.  Sweden.  Danes  in  alliance  with  Russia. 
1813-1814.  Russia,  Prussia,  Austria,  and  Sweden;  ended  by  Peace 
of  Kiel. 

Christian  VIII,  1839-1848 

Frederick  VII,  1848-1863 

1848-1851.  Revolts  in  Schleswig-Holstein. 

1848-1849.  Prussia  and  the  German  GDufederation.  ) 

1849.  Prussia. 

1849-1850.  German  Confederation. 

Christian  IX,  1863-1906 
1864.  Austria  and  Prussia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Vienna. 


V 

ENGLAND 

As  a  broad  general  statement  it  is  fair  to  say 
that  all  nations  have  devoted  about  half  their 
time  to  war  and  half  to  peace.  The  exact 
figures  for  the  average  of  all  nations  here 
studied  is  48  per  cent  war  and  52  per  cent 
peace,  for  the  period  1450-1900. 

England  in  comparison  with  other  countries 
has  done  her  share  of  fighting,  perhaps  a  little 
more.  She  totals  419  war  years  in  eight  cen- 
turies, or  52.4  per  cent.  Except  for  England 
and  France,  we  have  not  carried  the  research 
into  the  period  prior  to  1450,  but  for  these 
two  countries  we  are  able  to  present  the 
earlier  dates  and  these  must  be  viewed  with 
considerable  interest.  They  extend  the  series 
backward  by  seven  half -centuries,  and  these, 
added  to  the  nine  later  half -centuries,  give  a 
long  enough  stretch  to  make  one  expect  to 
come  upon  evidence  of  a  declining  curve  or 
general  tendency  for  war  periods  to  diminish. 
Such,  however,  is  not  the  case  either  for 
England  or  France.  The  English  figures  are 
here  given  for  the  eight  centuries  studied. 


1100 


1200 


1300 


1400 


I50O 


1600 


1700 


1800 


16  38.5  17.5  26  29  126.5  26  27.5 


1900 


38   16  19  17  39.5  25.5  38  19 


54 


65 


57 


54.5 


43.5 


55.5 


53.5 


212  wa>r  yearb 


207  war  years 


44  IS  WAE  DIMINISHING? 

These  figures  vary  from  16  out  of  50  to  39.5 
out  of  50.  The  first  400  years  show  212  years 
of  war,  the  second  400  years  show  207.  The 
difference  of  only  5  years  is  neghgible  in  such 
a  large  total. 

Such  facts  as  these,  concerning  as  they  do 
one  of  the  dominant  civilized  nations  of  the 
earth,  make  us  pause  in  serious  thought.  It 
cannot  be  said  that  the  later  wars  were  trivial 
in  comparison  to  the  earlier.  It  is  true  that  a 
large  number  of  the  English  wars  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  were  fought  in  distant  climes 
to  maintain  the  Empire  against  inferior  foes, 
and  were  small  in  comparison  with  the  popu- 
lation of  the  realm;  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
many  of  the  early  wars,  so-called,  were  merely 
insurrections  soon  stamped  under  foot.  Yes, 
England  has  been  a  conquering  nation  and 
she  has  fought  more  than  half  of  the  time. 
Her  three  great  maximum  eras  of  belligerency 
occurred  in  the  years  1100-1150;  1300-1450; 
1550-1600.  The  chief  generalization  concern- 
ing these  three  periods  is  that  they  were 
all  largely  filled  with  combats  against  alien 
races,  and  were  fought  for  the  domination  of 
these  races.  The  long  wars  in  the  first  part  of 
the  twelfth  century  against  Normandy  and 
France  were  chiefly  dynastic  in  their  motives 
and  were  to  maintain  Henry  I  in  his  pos- 
sessions  across   the    Channel.     The  second 


ENGLAND  45 

great  period,  1300-1450,  contains  first  the 
attempted  conquest  of  Scotland  and  then  the 
** Hundred  Years'  War,"  or  the  attempted 
conquest  of  France.  All  these  had  a  strong 
personal  and  dynastic  setting,  though,  of 
course,  other  motives  entered.  The  third 
great  era,  1550-1600,  is  represented  by  the 
struggle  against  Spain,  commercial  and  partly 
religious  in  its  causation. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  "Wars  of  the 
Roses,"  the  civil  wars  of  the  Stuarts,  and 
other  internal  dissensions  in  England  do  not 
swell  the  war  years  beyond  the  average  point. 
This  gives  statistical  support  to  the  notion 
that  England  has  on  the  whole  been  a  well 
and  harmoniously  governed  country. 

England,  1100-1914^ 
Benry  Z,  1100-1135 

1101.  Robert  of  Normandy. 

1102.  Rebellion  of  Robert  of  Bellesme. 

1104-1106.  Invasion  of  Normandy,  both  civil  and  foreign  war. 
1106-1128.  A  continuation  of  the  war  against  Normandy  and 
France. 

Stephen,  1135-1154 

1136-1138.  Scottish  invasions.  Battle  of  the  Standards. 

1138-1148.  Civil  war  between  Stephen  and  Matilda. 

1149-1150.  Civil  war  renewed  between  Stephen  and  Matilda. 

1152-1153.  Civil  war  again  renewed  between  Stephen  and  Matilda. 

Henry  II,  1154-1189 

1158.  Welsh  War. 

1163.  Second  Welsh  War. 


46  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

1165.  Third  Welsh  War. 
1169-1172.  War  in  Ireland. 
1173-1174.  Rebellion,  headed  by  Prince  Henry. 
1188-1189.  France  in  alliance  with  Princes  Richard  and  John. 

Richard  Z,  118&-1199 

1190-1192.  Third  Crusade. 
1194-1200.  France. 

John,  1199-1216 

1200-1202.  Rebellion  of  the  Poictevin  nobles. 

1202-1204.  France  in  alliance  with  the  Poictevin  nobles.  Bouvines. 

1213-1214.  France.  The  campaign  of  Bouvines. 

1215-1216.  France.  John's  last  war. 


Regencyy  121G-1227 

1216-1217.  France. 

1219-1223.  Welsh  War. 

1223-1225.  France. 

1224.  Welsh  War. 

Henry  111,  1227-1272 

1228-1231.  Welsh  War. 

1233-1234.  Welsh  War. 

1241.  Welsh  War. 

1241-1243.  France.  Henry  Ill's  loss  of  Poitou. 

1245.  France. 

1257.  War  in  Wales  against  Llewelyn  and  GriflSth. 

1259.  France. 

1263-1267.  Civil  War  of  Sunon  de  Montfort  against  Henry  III. 

Edward  7,  1272-1307 

1272-1276.  Edward  I's  First  Welsh  W^ar,  against  Llewelyn. 

1277.  A  continuation  of  the  Welsh  War. 

1282-1283.  Third  Welsh  War,  against  Llewelyn  and  David. 

1294-1298.  France,  on  sea  and  in  Guyenne. 

1294-1295.  Welsh  War  (fourth). 

1296.  Conquest  of  Scotland. 

1297-1304.  Scottish  War. 

1306-1307.  Bruce's  rebellion  in  Scotland. 


ENGLAND  47 

Edward  II,  1307-1327 

1310.  Scottish  expedition  of  Piers  Gaveston.' 
1311-1323.  Scotland.  Bannockbum. 
1321-1322.  Revolt  against  Edward  II. 
1324-1327.  France,  in  Guyenne. 
1326-1327.  Final  revolt  against  Edward  II. 

Regency,  1327-1330 
1326-1328.  Scotland.  Scottish  independence  recognized. 

Edward  III,  1330-1377 

1332-1357.  Scottish  intervention  and  war. 

1337-1340.  France.  Beginning  in  Bretagne  of  the  Hundred  Years* 
War. 

1341-1347.  Renewal  of  Hundred  Years'  War.  Campaign  of  Crecy. 
Calais. 

1355-1357.  France.  Campaign  of  Poitiers. 

1359-1360.  France;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Bretigny. 

1367-1368.  Interference  in  Castilian  War  in  favor  of  Pedro. 

1369-1375.  France.  Capture  of  Limoges.  John  of  Gaunt's  expedi- 
tion. 

Regency,  1377-1389 

1377-1380.  France  and  Scotland. 
1381.  Wat  Tyler's  rebellion. 
1383-1389.  France. 

Richard  II,  1389-1399 

1385-1387.  War  of  the  Lords  Appellant  in  Scotland. 

1388.  Chevy  Chase  campaign  in  Scotland  and  Northumbeiv 
land. 
1394-1395.  First  Irish  expedition. 

1399.  Second  Irish  expedition. 

1399.  Lancaster's  expedition. 

Henry  IV,  1399-1413 

1400.  Rebellion  for  Richard  II  in  Rutland  and  elsewhere.  ' 
1400-1409.  Welsh  rebellion  under  Owen  Glendower. 
1402-1403.  Scottish  invasion  under  Douglas. 

1403.  Percy's  rebellion. 

1405.  Scroope's  rebellion. 

1405.  Depredations  of  French  fleet  off  Welsh  coast. 


48  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

1406.  Renewal  of  Hundred  Years'  War. 

1408.  Northumberland's  rebellion. 

1411.  Intervention  in  France  in  favor  of  the  Burgundians. 

1412.  Intervention  in  France  in  favor  of  the  Annagnacs. 

Henry  V,  1413-1422 

1415-1420.  France;  ended  by  the  Peace  of  Troyes.  Agincourt. 
1421-1422.  France.  Last  campaign  of  Henry  V. 

Regency,  1422-1440 
1423-1439.  France.  English  under  Bedford,  York,  and  Warwick. 

Henry  VI,  1440-1461 

1440-1444.  France;  ended  by  Angevin  Marriage  Treaty. 
1448-1450.  France.  Loss  of  Normandy,  etc. 

1450.  Cade's  rebellion. 
1450-1453.  France.   End  of  the  Hundred  Years'  War  in  failure. 

1455.  Beginning  of  the  Wars  of  the  Roses. 
1459-1464.  Wars  of  the  Roses,  ending  with  Lancastrian  defeat  at 
Hexham. 

Edward  IV,  1461-1483 

1469-1471.  Wars  of  the  Roses.  Lancastrian  defeats  at  Baraet  and 
Tewkesbury. 

1475.  Invasion  of  France  and  Peace  of  Pecquigny. 

1480.  Scotland,  ended  by  Treaty  of  Fotheringay. 
1482-1484.  Scotland. 

Richard  III,  1483-1485 

1483.  Buckingham's  rebellion. 

1485.  Successful  campaign  of  Henry  Tudor  for  the  crown. 

Henry  VII,  1485-1509 

1486.  Lovell's  rising. 

1487.  Lambert  Simnel's  rising. 
1489-1492.  France,  m  Bretagne. 

1495.  Perkin  Warbeck's  first  expedition  for  English  crown. 
1496-1497.  Warbeck's  second  expedition. 

Henry  VIII,  1509-1547 

1512-1514.  France.   Battle  of  the  Spurs. 
1513-1515.  Scotland.  Campaign  of  Flodden  Field. 
1522-1523.  Scotland. 


ENGLAND  49 

1522-1525.  France.  Invasion  of  France  a  failure.  Amicable  loan. 

1532-1534.  Scotland. 

1534-1535.  Fitzgerald's  Irish  expedition. 

1542-1546.  Scotland.  Campaign  of  Solway  Moss,  etc. 

1544-1546.  France.  Siege  of  Boulogne. 

Regency,  1547-1553 

1547-1548.  Interference  of  Somerset  in  Scotland. 
1548-1550.  Scotland. 
1548-1550.  France. 

1549.  Rebellion  in  Devon. 

1549.  Ket's  rebellion. 

Mary,  1553-1558 
1557-1559.  France.  Loss  of  Calais. 

Elizabeth,  1558-1603 

1559-1560.  Scotland  and  France;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Edinburgh. 
1561-1567.  Rebellion  of  Shawn  O'Neill  in  Ulster. 
1562-1564.  Alliance  with  Huguenots  at  Hampton  Court  and  French 
War. 
1569.  Rising  of  Catholic  nobles  in  North  of  England. 
1569-1583.  Fitzmaurice  and  the  Munster  rebellion. 
1585-1604.  Spain.  Armada  campaign. 
1594-1603.  Hugh  O'Neill's  rebellion  in  Ulster. 

James  Z,  1603-1624 
1624-1625.  English  intervention  in  Thirty  Years'  War. 

CharUs  Z,  1624-1649 

1625-1630.  Spain. 

1627-1630.  France.  La  Rochelle  expedition. 

1639.  First  Bishops'  War. 

1640.  Second  Bishops'  War. 
1641-1643.  Irish  rebellion. 

1642-1646.  First  part  of  the  great  Civil  War. 
1648.  Second  part  of  the  great  Civil  War. 

The  Ccmmonwealth,  1649-1660 

1649-1652.  Cromwell's  Irish  War. 

1650-1651.  Scottish  War,  the  invasion  under  Charles  Stuart. 

1652-1654.  Holland.  Blake  vs.  Van  Tromp. 


50  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

1654-1659.  Spain,  ended  by  Peace  of  Pyrenees. 
1655.  Penruddock's  rising  in  Salisbury. 
1655.  Coercion  of  the  Barbary  States. 

Charles  II,  1660-1685 

1661.  Venner's  rising. 
1664-1667.  Holland;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Breda.  Capture  of  Dutch 

America. 
1666-1667.  France;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Breda. 
1666-1667.  Denmark;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Breda. 
1672-1674.  Holland.  Charles  H  m  alliance  with  Louis  XIV.  Peace 

of  Westminster. 
1677-1679.  Rising  of  the  Covenanters  in  Scotland. 

James  II,  1685-1689 
1685.  Monmouth's  rebellion. 

William  and  Mary,  1689-1702 

1688-1692.  Struggle  of  William  HI  against  James  II. 
1688-1697.  France  and  her  allies.  War  of  the  League  of  Augsburg. 
1700.  Participation  in  Dano-Swedish  War. 

Anne,  1702-1714 
1701-1713.  France  and  her  allies.  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession. 

George  7,  1714-1727 

1715-1716.  The  Old  Pretender. 
1715-1719.  Naval  action  against  Sweden. 
1718-1720.  Spain.  War  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance. 
1720-1721.  Naval  action  against  Russia  and  her  allies. 

Gecyrge  II,  1727-1760 

1727-1729.  Spain;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Seville. 

1739-1748.  Spain.  War  of  Jenkins's  Ear. 

1740-1748.  France  and  Prussia.  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession. 

1745-1746.  The  Young  Pretender. 

1755-1763.  France  and  her  allies.  Seven  Years'  War. 

George  III,  1760-1811 

1762-1763.  Spain.  England  in  alliance  with  Portugal. 
1763-176^.  Emperor  Shar  Alam  in  India. 
1764.  Sepoy  Mutiny. 


ENGLAND  51 

1770.  Friction  with  Spain  in  Falkland  Islands. 
1775-1783.  War  of  American  Independence.  Treaty  of  Paris. 
1778-1783.  France  in  alliance  with  American  revolutionists. 
1778-1781.  Mahratta  War. 
1779-1783.  Spain;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Paris. 
1780-1783.  Holland. 

1792.  Tippu  Sahib. 
1793-1802.  France;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Amiens. 
1795-1802.  Holland,  the  ally  of  France. 

1799.  Tippu  Sahib,  in  alliance  with  Bonaparte. 

1801.  Denmark. 
1802-1806.  Mahrattas,  led  by  Holkar. 
1803-1814.  France,  ended  by  first  Treaty  of  Paris. 

1806.  Sepoy  Mutiny. 

1807.  Attack  on  Turks  at  Constantinople. 

1807-1812.  Russia,  the  ally  of  France  in  her  Continental  System. 

George  IV  {Regent,  1811;  King,  1820-1830) 

1812-1815.  United  States.   Battle  of  New  Orieans  after  Treaty  of 

Ghent. 

1814-1815.  War  m  Nepal. 

1815.  France.  Les  Cent  Jours,  and  Waterioo. 

1816.  Attack  on  Algiers. 

1817.  Pindari  War. 
1817-1818.  Last  Mahratta  War. 
1824-1826.  War  in  Burma. 

1827.  Assistance  to  the  Greeks  against  Turkey  at  Navarino. 

William  IV,  1830-1837 
1831-1832.  Action  in  Belgium. 

Victoria,  1837-1901 

1837.  Rebellion  in  Canada. 
1838-1842.  War  in  Afghanistan. 
1840-1841.  Interference,  together  with  other  powers,  in  Egyptian 

War. 
1840-1842.  Opium  War  in  China. 

1845.  Interference  in  Uruguay. 

1845.  First  Sikh  War. 
1848-1849.  Second  Sikh  War. 
1850-1852.  War  with  the  Kaffirs. 
1854-1856.  Russia.  Crimean  War. 
1856-1859.  China;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Tien-Tsin. 


52  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

1856-1857.  Persia. 

1857-1858.  Sepoy  rebellion.  Relief  of  Lucknow. 

1861-1862.  Participation  in  expedition  to  Mexico. 

1863-1869.  Maori  War. 

1867-1868.  Abyssinian  expedition. 

1874.  AshantiWar. 

1879.  Zulu  War. 
1880-1881.  War  in  the  Transvaal. 
1882-1884.  Acquisition  of  Egypt. 
1884-1885.  Gordon's  Soudan  expedition. 
1884-1885.  Relief  expedition  to  save  Gordon. 

1885.  Riel's  revolt  in  Canada. 
1885-1889.  War  in  Burma. 

1895.  War  in  India. 

1895.  Jameson  Raid  in  South  Africa. 

1896.  Ashanti  expedition. 
1896-1900.  War  in  Egypt. 

1899-1902.  Boer  rebellion  in  South  Africa. 

1900.  Participation  in  suppression  of  Boxer  rebellion  in  China. 

Edward  VII,  1901-1910 
1901-1902.  Somahland  expedition  of  English  and  Abyssinians. 

George  F,  1910- 
1914r-  Germany,  Austria,  and  Turkey. 


VI 

FRANCE 

What  was  said  for  England  may  be  said  for 
France.  Here  we  have  eight  centuries  of  the 
records  of  battles  and  no  lessening  in  the  time 
they  fill.  In  fact,  there  is  a  slight  increase 
from  the  first  four  centuries  to  the  last  four. 
The  figures  below  represent  the  number  of 
fighting  years  during  each  half-century  and 
century. 


1100 


1200 


1300 


1400 


1500 


1600 


1700 


1800 


1900 


26.5 

I'Q:? 

31.5 

17.5 

18 

25 

35.5 

17 

29.5 

31 

24 

22.5 

25 

25.5 

18 

17 

36.5 

49 

43 

52.5 

60.5 

46.5 

50.5 

35   1 

181, 

192.5            1 

The  first  portion  of  the  record  totals  181 
years  of  war;  the  second  totals  192.5.  Thus, 
if  we  had  paid  attention  alone  to  the  second 
half  of  the  record,  we  should  have  received 
an  erroneous  impression.  The  high  mark, 
31  years,  during  the  half-century  1550-1600, 
and  the  two  low  marks,  18  and  17,  during  the 
nineteenth  century,  would  have  led  to  the 
false  belief  that  French  history  gives  evidence 
of  decline  of  belligerent  activity.  It  may  be 
that  the  smaller  figures  18  and  17  are  really 
significant  and  due  to  the  heightening  of 
"  civilization  ";  to  moral  causes  not  operative 


54  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

in  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries.  The 
low  figures  in  those  centuries  may  have  been 
due  to  causes  more  materialistic,  economic  or 
physical.  This  is  possible.  All  we  can  say 
is,  statistically  there  is  no  warrant  from  the 
history  of  France  (or  from  the  history  of 
England)  that  warfare  is  becoming  less  im- 
portant or  that  it  is  engaging  less  of  the  time 
and  attention  of  mankind  with  the  slow  and 
gradual  development  of  social  evolution. 

French  wars  have  been  frequent,  though 
they  have  seldom  been  of  great  duration.  Her 
longest  period  of  war  lasted  twenty -five  years, 
when  the  Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  con- 
vulsion involved  her  continually  in  either 
foreign  or  civil  war  from  1789  to  1814.  Her 
second  longest  continuous  war  period,  1635- 
1659,  was  her  great  struggle  against  the  house 
of  Hapsburg,  which  included  part  of  the 
''Thirty  Years'  War"  against  Austria  and 
the  Spanish  War  ending  in  the  "Peace  of  the 
Pyrenees."  There  was  a  great  deal  of  fighting 
during  the  first  half  of  the  thirteenth  century. 
These  wars  were  important  for  France.  They 
prevented  domination  of  the  North  by  Eng- 
land, and  in  the  South  they  were  wars  of  con- 
quest. 

From  1400  to  1450  there  was  another  pe- 
riod of  excessive  warfare.  It  was  the  last 
half  of  the  "Hundred  Years'  War";  but  it 


FRANCE  55 

should  be  noted  that  the  entire  "  Hundred 
Years'  War"  had  many  intermissions,  so 
that  during  this  period  about  forty  per  cent 
of  the  years  were  of  peace.  The  third  great 
era  of  wars,  1550-1600,  was  less  creditable 
to  France  and  it  did  not  aid  in  any  national 
upbuilding.  This  was  the  period  of  the  Guises, 
of  Catherine  de  Medici,  and  of  the  Huguenot 
civil  wars.  Thus  the  history  of  France  shows 
somewhat  more  civil  warfare  than  does  that 
of  England,  but  neither  of  these  countries  has 
been  guilty  of  an  excessive  amount  of  inter- 
nal destruction.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
what  we  now  call  France  was  built  up  largely 
by  conquests,  added  from  time  to  time  to  the 
nucleus  that  originally  lay  about  Paris.  Of 
course  France  has  been,  on  the  whole,  success- 
ful in  war  and  a  conquering  country,  other- 
wise the  territory  between  Belgium,  the  Alps, 
the  Pyrenees,  and  the  Atlantic  would  not  now 
be  called  France. 

France,  1100-1914 

Louis  Vly  1108-1137 
1104-1106.  England. 
1106-1128.  England. 
1108-1116.  Civil  war. 

Louis  VII,  1137-1180 

1142.  War  with  Thibaud  de  Champagne. 
1147-1149.  Second  Crusade. 
1154-1155.  Attack  on  Normandy. 
1173-1174.  Aid  given  the  revolting  English  princes. 


56  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

Philip  Augustus,  1180-1223 

1188-1189.  Aid  given  Richard  and  John,   of    England,   against 

Henry  II. 

1190-1191.  Third  Crusade. 

1194-1200.  England. 

1202-120-i.  England. 

1207-1208.  War  in  Acquitaine. 

1207-1215.  Raimond of  Toulouse.  FirstAlbigensian  War  (Crusade). 

1213-1214.  England.  Campaign  of  Bouvines. 

1215-1216.  England. 

1216-1217.  England. 

1216-1222.  Raimond  of  Toulouse.  Second  Albigensian  War. 

Louis  VIII,  1223-1226 

1223-1225.  England. 

1223-1226.  Third  Albigensian  War. 

Regency,  1226-1236 

1226-1229.  Fourth  Albigensian  War;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Paris. 
1226-1231.  Strife  with  the  barons. 
1233-1234.  Strife  wdth  the  barons. 

Louis  IX,  1236-1270 

1241-1243.  England.  Recovery  of  Poitou  by  the  French. 

1244.  Fifth  Albigensian  War,  and  extermination  of  Albigen- 

sians. 

1245.  England. 
1248-1254.  Seventh  Crusade. 

1251.  First  rising  of  the  Pastoureaux. 
1253-1255.  War  in  Flanders. 
1259.  England. 

1268.  Expedition  of  Charles  of  Anjou  in  Italy. 
1270.  Eighth  Crusade. 

PUli'p  III,  1270-1285 
1276.  Castile. 

Philip  IV,  1285-1314 

1284-1291.  Aragon. 

1294-1298.  England  and  Flanders. 

1300-1305.  War  in  Flanders.  Campaign  of  Courtrai. 

1314.  War  in  Flanders. 


FRANCE  57 

Louis  X,  1314-1316^ 

1315.  War  in  Flanders. 

Philip  F,  1316-1322 
1320.  Second  Pastoureaux  rising. 

Charles  IV,  1322-1328 

1324-1327.  England,  in  Guyenne. 

1328.  Flemish  War.   Campaign  of  Cassel. 

Philip  VI,  1328-1350 

1337-1340.  England.  Beginning  of  the  Hundred  Years*  War. 
1341-1347.  England.   Campaign  of  Crecy;  loss  of  Calais;  Hmidred 
Years'  War. 

John  Ily  1350-1356 
1355-1357.  England.  Campaign  of  Poitiers.  Hundred  Years'  War. 

Charles  F,  1356-1360 

1357-1358.  Rebellion  of  fitienne  Marcel. 

1359-1360.  England.    Hundred  Years*  War  broken  by  Peace  of 
Bretigny. 

John  Ily  1360-1364 
1363-1364.  War  in  Bretagne. 

Charles  F,  1364-1380 

1365-1368.  Interference  in  Castilian  War  in  favor  of  Henry  of 

Trastamara. 
1369-1375.  England.  John  of  Gaunt's  failure  and  French  gains. 
1377-1380.  England.  Hundred  Years'  War. 

Regency,  1380-1388 

1381-1382.  Popular  risings  in  Paris,  les  Maillotins,  etc. 

1382.  War  in  Flanders.   Campaign  of  Rosebeke. 

1383.  Repression  in  Northern  France. 
1383-1389.  England.  Hundred  Years'  War. 

Charles  VI,  1388-1422 

1395-1396.  Ten  thousand  troops  sent  against  the  Turks. 

1405.  Naval  resumption  of  Hundred  Years'  War. 
1405-1407.  Civil  war  of  Burgundians  against  Orleanists. 


58  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

1406.  Renewal  of  Hundred  Years'  War. 
1408.  Civil  war  Fesumed  by  Burgiindians  and  Orleanists. 
1410.  Civil    war    between    Burgundians:    and     Armagnacs 
(Orleanists). 
1411-1415.  Civil  war  between  Burgundians  and  Armagnacs. 
1415-1420.  England;  campaign  of  Agincourt;  ended  by  Treaty  of 
Troyes. 
1418.  Second  Cabochien  atrocities. 
1421-1422.  England.  Hundred  Years'  War. 

Charles  VIL  1422-1461 

1423-1439.  England.  Hundred  Years' War.  Era  of  Bedford,  Jeanne 

Dare. 
1440-1444.  England;  ended  by  Angevin  Marriage  Treaty. 
1448-1450.  England.   Recovery  of  Normandy. 
1450-1453.  England.  End  of  the  Hundred  Years'  War. 

Louis  XI,  1461-1483 

1461.  Acquisition  of  Cerdagne  and  Roussillon. 
1465-1466.  War  of  the  Ligue  du  Bien  Public;  ended  by  Treaty  of 
Conflans. 
1468.  Burgundy;  ended  by  meeting  at  Peronne  of  Louis  and 
Charles  the  Bold. 
1470-1472.  Burgundy. 

1473.  Trouble  in  Guyenne. 

1475.  Edward  IV's  invasion  of  France  and  Peace  of  Peo- 
quigny. 
1478-1479.  Occupation  of  Burgundy. 

Regency,  1483-1491 
1487-1488.  Rebellion  from  Breton  side. 

Charles  VIII,  1491-1498 

1489-1492.  England,  in  Bretagne. 

1494-1497.  Italian  campaign  of  Charles  VIII. 

1495.  War  with  the  Emperor. 

1496-1497.  War  with  the  Emperor. 

Louis  XII,  1498-1515 

1499-1504.  Italian  War  of  Louis  XII. 
1502-1504.  Spain,  in  Italy. 
1507.  Revolt  in  Genoa, 


I 


FRANCE  59 

1508-1510.  Venice.  France  in  League  of  Cambrai. 

1511-1513.  Venice;  ended  by  alliance.     Venice,  one  of  the   "Holy 

League." 
1511-1513.  Spain,  one  of  the  "Holy  League." 
1512-1514.  England,  one  of  the  "Holy  League."    Campaign  of 

Guinegate. 
1513-1514.  The  Empire,  one  of  the  "Holy  League." 

Francis  Z,  1515-1547 

1515-1517.  Italian  campaign  of  Marignano. 

1521-1526.  First  war  against  Charles  V;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Madrid. 

1522-1525.  England. 

1526-1529.  Second  war  against  Charies  V;  ended  by  Peace  of 

Cambrai. 
1536-1538.  Third  war  against  Charies  V;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Nice. 
1542-1544.  Fourth  war  agamst  Charies  V;  ended  by  Peace  of  Cr^py. 
1544-1546.  England.  Siege  of  Boulogne. 
1546-1548.  Interference  in  Scotland. 

Henry  II,  1547-1559 

1548.  Revolt  in  the  Bordelais. 
1548-1550.  England. 
1552-1556.  War  of  Henry  II  against  Charles  V;  ended  by  Truce  of 

Vaucelles. 
1556-1559.  Spain;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Cateau-Cambrlsis. 

Regency,  1559-1560 

1557-1559.  England;  capture  of  Calais;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Ca- 

teau-Cambresis, 
1559-1560.  England;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Edinburgh. 
1560.  Conspiration  d'Amboise. 

Regency,  1560-1571 

1562-1563.  First  Huguenot  War;  ended  by  Peace  of  Amboise. 
1562-1564.  England,  the  ally  of  the  Huguenots. 
1567-1568.  Second  Huguenot  War;  ended  by  Peace  of  Longjumeau. 
1569-1570.  Third  Huguenot  War;  ended  by  Peace  of  Saint-Germain. 

Charles  IX,  1571-1574 
1572-1573.  Fourth  Huguenot  War;  ended  by  Edict  of  Boulogne. 


-^ 


60  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

Henry  III,  1574-1589 

1575-1576.  Fifth  Huguenot  War;  ended  by  Paix  de  Monsieur. 
1576-1577.  Sixth  Huguenot  War;  ended  by  Peace  of  Poitiers. 

1580.  Seventh  Huguenot  W^ar;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Fleix. 
1581-1583.  Expeditions  to  Flanders. 

1585-1594.  War  of  the  Three  Henrys,  then  of  Henry  IV  and  the 
Ligue. 

Henry  IV,  1588-1610 

1589-1598.  Sapin,  at  first  the  ally  of  the  Ligue. 
1600-1601.  War  in  Savoy. 

Regency,  1610-1621 

1615.  Condi's  rebellion. 

1619.  Struggle  between  Louis  XIII  and  Marie  de  Medicis. 

Louis  XIII,  1621-1643 

1621-1622.  Huguenot  War. 

1625-1626.  Huguenots  of  La  Rochelle. 

1627-1629.  Huguenots  of  La  Rochelle  and  Rohan. 

1627-1630.  England,  giving  aid  to  La  Rochelle. 

1629-1631.  Spain,  in  Savoy. 

1631-1632.  Rebellion  of  Gaston  d'Orleans  and  Montmorency. 

1635-1648.  Empire  and  its  aUies.  Thirty  Years'  War. 

Regency,  1643-1661 

1648-1659.  Spanish  War  continued  to  Peace  of  the  Pyrenees. 
1648-1649.  La  Fronde. 
1650.  La  Fronde. 
1650-1652.  La  Fronde. 

Lmiis  XIV,  1661-1715 

1663-1664.  Turkey.  France  the  ally  of  the  Emperor  at  St.  Gothard. 
1666-1667.  England;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Breda. 
1667-1668.  Spain;  then  Holland,  England,  and  Sweden  intervened. 
1672-1678.  Holland;  ended  by  Peace  of  Nijmwegen. 
1672-1678.  Spain;  ended  by  Peace  of  Nijmwegen. 
1672-1673.  Brandenburg-Prussia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Vossem. 
1673-1679.  Austria;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Nijmwegen. 
1674-1679.  Empire;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Nijmwegen. 
1674-1679.  Brandenburg-Prussia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Saint-Germain- 
en-Laye. 


FRANCE  61 

1675-1679.  Denmark;  ended  by  Peace  of  Fontainebleau. 

1681.  Seizure  of  Strassburg. 

1682.  Seizure  of  Luxemburg. 

1683-1684.  The  Empire  and  Spain,  and  Truce  of  Regensburg. 
1688-1697.  War  against  the  League  of  Augsburg;  ended  by  Peace  of 

Ryswick. 
1701-1713.  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession;  ended  by  Peace  of 

Utrecht. 
1713-1714.  War  continued  against  Austria  alone. 

Regency,  1715-1723 
1718-1720.  Spain;  war  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance. 

Regency,  1723-1731 

Louis  XV,  1731-1774 

1733-1735.  Austria  and  Russia.  War  of  the  Polish  Succession. 
1 740-1 748.  England  and  Austria.   War  of  the  Austrian  Succession. 
1743-1748.  Holland.   War  of  the  Austrian  Succession. 
1755-1763.  England  and  Prussia.    Seven  Years'  War.    Peace  of 

Paris. 
1768-1769.  Annexation  of  Corsica. 

Louis  XVI,  1774-1793 

1778-1783.  England;  France  allied  with  American  revolutionists. 
1789-1793.  The  French  Revolution. 

Republic,  1793-1799 

1792-1795.  Prussia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Basel. 

1792-1797.  Austria;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Campo  Formio. 

1792-1796.  Sardinia. 

1793-1802.  England;  ended  by  Peace  of  Amiens. 

1793-1801.  Portugal. 

1793-1795.  Holland;  ended  by  formation  of  Batavian  Republic. 

1793-1795.  Spain;  ended  by  Peace  of  Basel. 

1798-1801.  Austria;  ended  by  Peace  of  Luneville. 

1798-1799.  Naples;  ended  by  formation  of  Parthenopean  Republic. 

Consulate,  1799-1804 
1798-1801.  Turkey. 

1798-1800.  Russia;  ended  by  accession  of  Paul. 
1799-1801.  Naples;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Florence. 
1802-1803.  Haytian  revolts.  Leclerc's  expedition. 


62  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

Napoleon,  1804-1814 

1803-1814.  England;  ended  by  First  Treaty  of  Paris. 

]  805.  Austria;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Pressburg.  Third  Gjalition. 
1805-1807.  Russia;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Tilsit. 
1805-1810.  Sweden;  ended  by  Peace  of  Paris  of  1810. 
1806-1807.  Prussia;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Tilsit. 
1807-1814.  Portugal,  the  ally  of  England. 
1808-1814.  War  ^ith  the  Spanish  people. 

1809.  Austria;  ended  by  Treaty  of  SchGnbrunn. 
1812-1814.  Russia;  ended  by  First  Treaty  of  Paris. 
1812-1814.  Prussia;  ended  by  First  Treaty  of  Paris. 
1813-1814.  Austria;  ended  by  First  Treaty  of  Paris. 
1813-1814.  Sweden;  ended  by  First  Treaty  of  Paris. 

Louis  XVIII,  1814-1815 

Napoleon,  Les  Cent  Jours 

1815.  England,  Russia,  Prussia,  Austria,  Sweden,  etc.,  Les 
Cent  Jours. 

Louis  XVIII,  1815-1824 
1823.  Repression  by  Bourbon  Government  of  Spanish  revolts. 

CharUs  X,  1824-1830 

1827.  Turkey.   Aid  given  Greeks  at  Navarino 
1830.  Revolution  of  July. 
1830.  Capture  of  Algiers. 

Louis  Philippe,  1830-1848 

1836.  Strassburg  attempt  of  Louis  Napoleon. 
1840.  Boulogne  attempt  of  Louis  Napoleon. 
1840-1841.  France  opposed  bv  the  powers  in  the  Egyptian  imbrog- 
lio. 

1848.  Revolution  of  1848. 

Republic,  1848-1852 

1849.  War  in  Italy  in  defense  of  Papal  States. 

Napoleon  III,  1852-1870 

1854-1856.  Russia.   Crimean  War;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Paris. 
1857-1859.  Expedition  to  China. 

1859.  Austria;  ended  by  Peace  of  Zurich. 


FRANCE  63 

1860-1861.  Defense  of  Papal  States. 

1861-1867.  Mexican  enterprise. 

1870-1871.  Prussia  and  her  allies;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Frankfort. 

Republic,  1870 

1871.  The  Commune. 

1881.  Expedition  to  Tunis. 
1882-1884.  Black  Flag  War  in  Anam. 
1884-1885.  China;  ended  by  treaty  confirming  Treaty  of  Tien-Tsin. 

1893.  War  in  Siam. 

1895.  Occupation  of  Madagascar. 

1900.  Participation  in  repression  of  Boxer  Revolt  in  China. 
1914-        .  Germany,  Austria,  and  Turkey.  War  of  the  AlUances. 


VII 

HOLLAND 
Years  oj  War  by  Half -Centuries  and  by  Centuries 

1600 1700 1800 19ga 


48.5 

36 

26.5 

18 

11.5 

14.5 

0.0 

62.5 

29.5 

14.5                 1 

From  her  sudden  emergence  as  a  real  power 
during  the  third  quarter  of  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury, Holland  has,  with  one  exception,  exhib- 
ited a  steady  line  of  diminution  in  warfare. 
Her  history  begins  with  the  war  of  liberation 
from  the  Spanish  yoke,  which  is  quite  as 
bloody  a  page  as  any  in  the  war  book  of  the 
nations.  Throughout  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries,  however,  she  fought  less 
and  less,  tracing  a  curve  the  significance  of 
which  will  be  alluded  to  later.  She  took  no 
slight  part  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  and 
fought  later  against  the  Bourbon  domination 
in  Europe.  The  exception  to  her  general 
downward  tendency  is  that  introduced  by  the 
French  Revolution,  when  the  little  country 
was  gathered  in  by  France  and  taken  in  the 
meshes  of  war  much  against  her  will. 

Holland  and  Sweden  are  the  only  countries 
here  tabulated  that  have  been  able  to  avoid 
war  altogether  in  any  period  of  fifty  years,  a 


HOLLAND  65 

fact  due,  perhaps,  to  impotence  rather  than 
to  strength. 

Holland,  1566-1914 

1566-1567.  Revolt  of  the  "Beggars." 

William  the  Silent,  dr.  1575-1584 
1568-1579.  War  of  Independence. 

Maurice  of  Nassau,  1584-1625 

1579-1609.  War  of  liberation  against  Spain,  after  declaration. 
1618.  Overthrow  of  Oldenbarnveldt. 

Frederick  Henry,  1625-1647 
1621-1648.  Continuation  of  war  with  Spain. 

William  II,  1647-1650 

The  States,  1650-1672 

1652-1654.  England.  Van  Tromp  vs.  Blake. 

1657-1661.  Portugal. 

1658-1660.  Sweden.  Part  of  Second  Great  Northern  War. 

1664-1665.  Hostilities  with  England. 

1665-1667.  Open  war  with  England;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Breda. 

1667-1668.  France.    War  of  Devolution. 

William  III,  1672-1702 

1672-1674.  England;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Westminster. 
1672-1678.  France;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Nijmwegen. 
1675-1679.  Sweden. 

1688-1697.  France.  War  of  the  League  of  Augsburg. 
1700.  Intervention  in  Third  Great  Northern  War. 

The  States,  1702-1747 

1701-1713.  France.  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession.  ] 
1719-1720.  Spain.   War  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance. 
1743-1748.  France.  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession. 
1747.  Orange  Revolution. 


66  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

WiUiam  IV,  1747-1751 

Regency,  1751-1759 

Republic,  1759-3766 
William  F,  1766-1795 

1780-1783.  England. 

1785.  Democratic  riots. 

1786.  Democratic  riots. 

1793-1795.  France;  ended  by  creation  of  Batavian  Republic. 

Republic,  1795-1805 
1795-1802.  England.  Holland  the  ally  of  France. 

Louis  Bonaparte,  1806-1810 

1798-1813.  As  ally  of  France,  Holland  followed  her  in  every  war. 
1813-1814.  Revolt  against  French  regime. 

William  I,  King  of  the  Netherlands,  1815-1840 

1815.  France.   Les  Cent  Jours  and  Waterloo. 
1830.  Separation  of  Belgium  from  Holland. 


VIII 

THE  OLD  KINGDOM  OF  POLAND 

1500 1600 1700 1800 


27 


29 


32 


36 


17 


5.5 


55 


22.5 


The  above  war  statistics  of  the  old  kingdom 
of  Poland  give  us  a  figure  with  a  gradual  rise 
to  an  apex,  a  consistent  increase  in  war  from 
1450  to  the  second  half  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  when  "The  Deluge,"  as  Sienkiewicz 
calls  this  cataclysm,  bade  fair  to  sweep  the 
nation  out  of  existence.  After  1700  there  was 
a  remarkable  falling  off  in  war  years.  Wars 
were  numerous  in  the  days  of  Casimir  IV, 
who  ruled  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  fifteenth 
century,  and  in  the  time  of  Sigismund  I,  in 
the  first  part  of  the  sixteenth;  but  they  were 
even  more  engaging  in  the  second  half  of  that 
cycle  when  the  Poles,  distracted  by  constant 
changes  of  dynasty,  embarked  in  the  First 
Great  Northern  War. 

There  was  at  that  time  a  very  conscious 
rivalry  with  the  huge  Slavic  power  to  the 
East,  and  Poland  revealed  great  military 
possibilities.  A  line  of  brilliant  captains  suc- 
ceeded Stephen  Bathory,  the  energetic  Tran- 
sylvanian  prince,  who  was  elected  to  fill  the 


68  IS  WAR  DEVIINISHING? 

throne,  made  vacant  in  1574  by  the  rapid 
flight  of  Henry  of  Valois.  Stephen  fought 
some  of  the  most  splendid  campaigns  in  all 
Polish  histon^  driving  Ivan  the  Terrible  back, 
and  forcing  him  to  peace;  but  the  reign  of 
this  great  man  was  brief  (1575-1586).  After 
Stephen's  death,  Jan  Zamoyski,  the  great 
chancellor,  carried  on  the  tradition,  although, 
like  Bathory  and  all  other  Polish  command- 
ers, he  was  hampered  more  than  aided  by  the 
obstructive  Diet  at  Warsaw. 

Indeed,  Poland  had  almost  steadily  ad- 
vanced in  prosperity  since  the  beginning  of  the 
Jagiellonic  period  in  1386  to  its  close  in  1572. 
Then,  under  Stephen  Bathory,  1575-1586,  her 
importance  continued  to  grow,  so  that  she  was 
universally  recognized  as  the  great  power  of 
Eastern  Europe.  Her  geographical  limits 
were  widely  extended.  With  Lithuania  united 
she  stretched  to  the  eastward  and  northward 
into  much  of  what  is  now  Russia.  To  the 
south  she  touched  the  Black  Sea  at  Aierman 
and  included  much  of  what  is  now  Austria 
and  Roumania.  On  the  east  she  extended  for 
one  hundred  miles  into  what  is  now  Prussia, 
reaching  through  to  the  Baltic  Sea  at  Dantzig. 

During  her  era  of  greatness  Poland  fought 
about  half  of  the  time,  54,  52,  and  58  per  cent. 
This  ratio  grew  to  64  and  72  per  cent  for  the 
next  two  half-centuries,  which  era  may  be 


THE  OLD  KINGDOM  OF  POLAND      69 

called  the  beginning  of  her  political  decline. 
After  the  year  1700  the  amount  of  time  de- 
voted to  warfare  declined  very  considerably, 
being  33  and  11  per  cent  for  the  next  two 
half -centuries,  after  which  Poland  ceased  to 
exist  as  a  political  entity. 

The  summarization  seems  to  be  that  three 
periods  are  found  in  Polish  history.  During 
the  first  she  was  politically  a  great  power  and 
fought  an  average  amount.  During  the  sec- 
ond, she  declined  in  prestige,  fighting  more 
than  an  average  amount.  During  the  third, 
she  declined  in  political  strength  and  greatly 
in  the  amount  of  her  belligerency. 

Poland,  1450-1795 
Casimir  IV,  1447-1492 

1454-1466.  Livonian  Order. 

1471-1479.  Matthias  Corvin  Huniadi,  of  Hungary. 

1486-1489.  Turkey. 

1490.  Raid  of  Cossacks,  Tatars,  Magyars,  etc. 

John  Albert,  1492-1501 

1492-1494.  War  between  Lithuania  and  Moscow. 

1497.  Short  Turkish  war. 
1497-1498.  Stephen  of  Moldavia. 

Alexander,  1501-1506 

1500-1503.  Moscow. 
1500-1506.  Stephen  of  Moldavia. 
1506.  Khan  of  the  Crimea. 

Sigismund  Z,  1506-1548 

1508.  Moscow. 
1510.  Tatar  raid. 
1511-1526.  Russia. 


70  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

1516.  Tatar  raid. 

1519.  Tatar  raid. 
1520-1521.  Livonian  Order. 

1527.  Tatar  raid. 

1530.  Moldavia. 

1533.  Tatar  raid. 
1534-1537.  Russia. 

Sigismund  II,  1548-1572 

1552.  Interference  in  Wallachia. 
1556-1557.  Livonian  Order.  Beginning  of  the  First  Great  Northern 
War. 

Interregnum,  1572-1573 
Henry  of  Valois,  1573-1574 
Stejphen  Bdthary,  1575-1586 

1572-1575.  Russia. 

1575.  Tatar  invasion. 
1583-1590.  Turkish  war  along  border.  ' 

Sigismund  III,  1587-1632 

1587-1588.  Archduke  Maximilian  and  the  ZborowskL 
1590.  Confederation  against  Zamoyski. 

1595.  Turkey. 

1596.  Cossacks;  put  down  by  Zolkiewski. 
1598-1600.  Cossacks;  again  put  down  by  Zolkiewski. 
1600-1609.  Sweden. 

1606.  Confederation  of  Zebrj'zdowski. 
1607-1609.  Insurrection  of  Zebrv'zdowski. 
1609-1618.  Russia;  arose  out  of  Russia's  anarcny. 

1613.  Cossack  expedition  in  Black  Sea. 
1615-1616.  Cossack  rebellion. 

1617.  Cossack  rebellion. 
1618-1621.  Turkey. 

1623-1625.  Cossacks;  who  were  subdued. 
1626-1629.  Sweden.   Campaign  of  Gustavus  Adolphus. 

Wladislam  IV,  1632-1648 

1632-1634.  Russia;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Polianovka. 
1632-1634.  Turkey. 

1634.  Cossack  revolt. 

1636.  Cossack  revolt. 


THE  OLD  KINGDOM  OF  POLAND      71 

1638.  Cossack  revolt. 

1638.  Attack  on  Dantzig,  and  destruction  of  fleet  by  Danes. 
1646-1648.  Tatar  and  Turkish  raids  in  Poland. 

John  Casimir,  1648-1668 

1648-1649.  Tatar  Khan  of  Crimea  at  war  with  Poland. 
1648-1649.  Cossack  rebellion,  headed  by  Chmelnitski. 
1651-1654.  Cossack  rebellion  and  secession  from  Poland. 
1654-1656.  Russia;  ended  by  Armistice  of  Vilna. 
1655-1660.  Sweden;  "The  Deluge"  in  Poland;  ended  by  Peace  of 

Oliwa. 
1656-1657.  Brandenburg;   ended  by  Treaty  of  Wehlau,  freeing 

Prussia. 
1657-1662.  Rakoczy,  of  Transylvania. 
1658-1667.  Renewal  of  Russian  war;  ended  by  Peace  of  Andrus- 

sowo. 
1667-1668.  Cossacks  and  Tatars,  headed  by  Doroshenke. 

Michael  Wisniomeckiy  1669-1673 
1672.  Turkey. 

John  III,  Sohieskiy  1674-1696 

1673-1675.  Turkey. 

1683-1699.  Turkey.  Sobieski's  Vienna  triumph. 

Augustus  II,  1697-1704 
Stanislaus  Leszczynski,  1704-1709 
1701-1706.  Sweden;  ended  by  Peace  of  Altranstadt. 

Augustus  11,  1709-1733 
1709-1719.  Sweden;  ended  by  a  truce,  which  was  made  permanent. 

Augustus  III,  1733-1763 
1733-1735.  War  of  the  Polish  Succession  against  Russia. 

Stanislaus  II,  Poniatowski,  1764-1795 

1768-1772.  War  of  the  Confederation  of  Bar,   leading  to  First 
Partition. 
1792.  Resistance  to  Russia  and  the  Second  Partition. 

1794.  Russia;  leading  to  the  Third  Partition. 

1795.  Prussia;  leading  to  the  Third  Partition. 


IX 

HOHENZOLLERN   PRUSSIA 
The  German  Empire  from  1871 

Prussian  military  history  may  be"  divided 
into  two  parts ;  first,  that  of  the  standing  mer- 
cenary^ army  developed  by  Frederick  William  I 
and  Frederick  the  Great,  which  fell  into  ig- 
nominious decrepitude  and  was  defeated  at 
Valmy ,  Jena,  and  Auerstadt ;  and  second,  that 
of  the  nation  in  arms,  an  idea  which  Prussia 
has  led  in  developing,  from  Scharnhorst  on 
through  ^Yilliam  I,  Roon  and  Bismarck,  to 
Wilham  II. 

The  figures  for  Prussia  commence  in  these 
statistics  in  1618,  the  year  when  the  electorate 
of  Brandenburg  and  the  duchy  of  Prussia 
were  united,  and  what  is  essentially  historic 
Prussia  made  her  appearance  in  European 
poHtics.  After  1871  the  German  Empire 
succeeds  Prussia.  Starting  with  a  very  high 
figure  for  the  Thirty  Years'  War  (1618-1648), 
during  most  of  which  the  elector,  though  not 
at  war,  could  not  prevent  the  utter  devas- 
tation of  his  territories  by  the  belligerents, 
Prussia  has  lowered  her  war  curve  almost 
steadily  until  a  surprisingly  peaceful  record 


HOHENZOLLERN  PRUSSIA  73 

of  four  per  cent  was  reached,  and  that  in  the 
time  of  Bismarck. 

\  It  is  rather  a  curious  fact,  and  one  worth 
commenting  on,  that  in  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury, in  the  days  of  the  mild  and  weak  George 
Wilham,  Prussia  should  have  been  visited  by 
a  great  amount  of  war,  and  that  during  the 
last  two  generations,  under  a  notoriously 
military  regime,  her  war  years  should  have 
declined  to  about  the  lowest  of  any  nation  in 
history.  The  real  lesson  to  be  drawn  from 
this  is  not  that  preparedness  makes  for  peace, 
but  rather  that  history  contains  many  anoma- 
lous phenomena.  If  in  a  long  sequence  of 
instances  it  should  be  found  that  a  major- 
ity of  the  wars  came  to  nations  relatively 
unprepared,  and  that  the  stronger  military 
powers  tended  to  maintain  themselves  in 
states  of  peace,  it  would  be  right  to  draw  the 
obvious  conclusions.  It  would  be  possible,  if 
we  had  a  systematic  compilation  of  the  wars 
of  a  great  many  nations,  to  get  some  light 
upon  this  problem.  In  the  mean  time  we 
should  withhold  opinion. 

Below  are  the  figures  for  Prussia  showing 
the  decline  in  war  years,  given  by  half- 
centuries  and  by  centuries. 

1600 ITOO 1800 1900 

39       19.5        20        11 7^5 5.5 

58.5  31        I         13 


74  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

Prussia,  1618-1871;  Germany,  1871-1914 

George  William,  1619-1640 

1625-1653.  Parts  of  the  realm  occupied  by  belligerents  and  by 

Swedes. 
1626-1629.  Sweden,  in  Prussia. 
1631-1635.  War  against  the  Emph-e;  ended  by  acceptance  of  Peace 

of  Prag. 
1635-1640.  Sweden. 

Frederick  William,  1640-1688 

1651.  Neuburg. 
1656-1657.  Poland;  ended  by  Peace  of  Wehlau. 
1657-1660.  Sweden;  alliance  at  Wehlau  with  Poland  and  Austria. 
1672-1673.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Vossem. 
1674-1679.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Saint-Germain-en-Laye. 
1675-1679.  Sweden;  ended  by  Peace  of  Saint-Germain-en-Laye. 
Fehrbellin. 

Frederick  I,  1688-1713 

1688-1697.  France.  War  of  the  League  of  Augsburg. 
1701-1713.  France  and  her  allies.  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession. 

Frederick  William  I,  1713-1740 
1715-1720.  Sweden. 

Frederick  II,  the  Great,  1740-1786 

1740-1742.  Austria.   First  Silesian  War;  ended  by  Peace  of  Breslau. 

1744-1745.  Austria.  Second  Silesian  War;  ended  by  Peace  of  Dres- 
den. 

1756-1763.  Austria.  Third  Silesian  War.  Seven  Years' War;  ended 
by  Peace  of  Hubertsburg. 

1756-1763.  France.  Seven  Years'  War;  ended  by  Peace  of  Paris. 

1757-1762.  Russia.  Seven  Years'  War;  ended  by  Peace  of  Paris. 

1757-1762.  Sweden.  Seven  Years'  War;  ended  by  Peace  of  Paris. 

1778-1779.  Austria.  War  of  the  Bavarian  Succession;  ended  by 
Peace  of  Teschen. 

Frederick  William  II,  1786-1797 

1792-1795.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Basel. 
1794-1795.  Poland;  leading  to  the  Third  Partition. 


HOHENZOLLERN  PRUSSIA  75 

Frederick  William  III,  1797-1840 

1806-1807.  France;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Tilsit. 

1812.  Russia;  ended  by  Convention  of  Tauroggen. 
1812-1814.  France;  ended  by  First  Treaty  of  Paris. 
1813-1814.  Denmark,  the  ally  of  France. 

1815.  France.  Les  Cent  Jours  and  Waterloo. 

Frederick  William  IV,  1840-1861 

1846.  Part  in  putting  down  Cracow  insurrection. 

1848.  Riots  in  Berlin. 

1848-1849.  First  War  of  Schleswig-Holstein  against  Denmark. 

1849.  Denmark.  Second  War  of  Schleswig-Holstein. 
1849.  Intervention  in  Baden. 

William  /,  1861-1888 

1864.  Denmark;  ended  by  Peace  of  Vienna. 
1866.  Austria;  ended  by  Peace  of  Prag. 
1870-1871.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Frankfort. 

Frederick  III,  1888-1888 

William  II,  1888- 

1914-        .  Russia,  France,  England,  Belgium,  Servia,  Japan.  War 
of  the  Alliances. 


X 

RUSSIA 

RrssL\,  whatever  may  be  the  reason,  has 
been  obliged  in  the  fulfillment  of  her  destiny 
to  engage  in  an  unusual  number  of  wars, 
many  of  them  covering  vast  stretches  both 
of  time  and  of  area.  Her  great  war  epochs 
came,  apparently,  by  fits  and  starts  at  inter- 
vals of  about  a  century  and  a  half.  The  age  of 
Ivan  the  Great  (1462-1505)  was  one  of  great 
struggles,  culminating  in  the  final  expulsion 
of  the  Tatars,  in  the  self-assertion  of  the 
autocrat  over  the  great  city  of  Novgorod,  and 
in  a  new  and  defiant  attitude  on  the  part  of 
Russia  in  regard  to  Poland-Lithuania,  her 
western  neighbor. 

The  half -century  that  followed  was  Russia's 
most  warlike,  with  its  battling  against  the 
Livonian  Order  of  Knights  and  against  Po- 
land, a  survival  of  the  old  struggle  of  German 
and  Slav,  which  again  to-day  is  uppermost. 
At  the  same  time  Tatars  raided  the  land  and 
stirred  up  rebellion  continually  in  Kazan. 
Evers'  man's  hand  was  against  his  neighbor 
in  the  last  decade  of  the  haK-century  when 
Ivan  the  Terrible  was  in  his  minority. 


RUSSIA  77 

From  83  per  cent  in  the  age  just  referred  to, 
Russia's  curve  sinks  only  to  72  per  cent  in  the 
second  half  of  the  cycle,  that  of  the  First 
Great  Northern  War,  when  Ivan  the  Terrible 
first  made  Russia  a  great  Baltic  power.  Then 
came  the  ** Troublous  Times,"  and  all  that 
had  been  gained  was  lost  for  a  while,  and  the 
tragic  faces  of  Boris  Godunov,  the  First  and 
Second  False  Dmitri,  Marya,  and  the  rest 
appear  and  pass  on.  Russia  was  in  anarchy 
until  1613,  when  patriotic  risings  brought  the 
House  of  Romanov  to  the  throne.  The  more 
peaceful  times  that  followed  make  the  war 
figure  for  1600-1650  a  fairly  low  one.  The 
next  raising  of  the  curve  comes  with  the  Sec- 
ond Great  Northern  War,  that  of  "The  Del- 
uge," when  Russia  fought  Poland,  Sweden, 
and  again  Poland.  The  complications  of  the 
Cossack  wars  and  in  the  last  years  of  the  cen- 
tury trouble  with  Turkey  added  to  the  war 
record.  The  eighteenth  century  was  one  of 
shorter  wars,  during  which  Russia  prepared 
herself  for  the  preponderant  role  which  she 
was  to  play  in  the  first  part  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  when  her  war  curve  rose 
again.  Part  of  the  increase  was  imparted  by 
the  Napoleonic  conflict,  but  Russia's  east- 
ward expansion  brought  other  complications, 
and  the  conquest  of  the  Caucasus,  while  in- 
volving no  huge  army,  was  the  work  of  many 


78  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

years.   This  was  the  epoch  of  Russian  pene- 
tration into  Central  Asia. 

The  very  high  percentage  of  war  years 
found  in  the  history  of  Russia,  during  her 
dark  and  early  period,  would  probably  on 
first  thought  be  ascribed  to  her  then  back- 
ward state  of  evolution,  but  this  does  not 
seem  to  be  a  justified  inference.  If  England 
and  France  in  their  more  archaic  periods 
showed  an  increase  in  war  activity  there 
would  be  the  pointed  suggestion  here  in 
regard  to  Russia.  Furthermore,  the  Russian 
"war  curve"  does  not  decline  more  than  a 
little  for  the  whole  four  hundred  and  fifty 
years  here  presented.  It  was  71  per  cent  as 
late  as  1800-1850.  Also  Holland,  Spain,  and 
Sweden  fought  from  75  to  95  per  cent  of  the 
time  during  their  eras  of  greatest  ''civiliza- 
tion." These  considerations  show  the  value 
of  the  comparative  method  in  historical  gen- 
eralization even  if,  as  in  this  case,  it  has  a 
negative  value. 


1500 

Russia 

1600 

s  Years  of  War 

1700                        1800 

1900 

29.5 

42.5 

36 

.18 

39.5 

..29 

20.5 

35.5 

17.5 

78.5 

57.5 

49.5 

53 

Russia,  1450-1914 

1450-1453.  Ch-il  war  with  Shemiaka. 

1455-1461.  Tatars. 

1456.  Repression  of  Novgorod. 

1458-1459.  Suppression  of  Viatka. 

1463.  Swedish  raid. 


RUSSIA  79 

Ivan  the  GreaU  1462-1505 

1464-1465.  Slight  war  with  Pskov. 

1465.  Tatar  inroad. 
1466-1467.  Raids  in  Finland  against  Swedes. 
1467-1469.  Expedition  against  Kazan. 

1468.  Tatars. 

1471.  Suppression  of  Novgorod. 

1472.  Conquest  of  Permia. 
1472.  Tatars. 

1478.  Final  suppression  of  Novgorod. 

1480.  Tatar  invasion.    Unsuccessful  campaign  of  Achmet. 

1480-1483.  Livonian  Order. 

1485.  Conquest  of  Tver. 

1487.  Capture  of  Kazan. 

1489.  Subjection  of  Viatka. 

1491-1510.  Sweden. 

1492-1494.  Lithuania. 

1496-1497.  Rebellion  in  Kazan. 

1499-1500.  Transural  expedition. 

1500-1503.  Lithuania  and  the  Livonian  Order. 

1503-1509.  War  continued  with  the  Livonian  Order  alone. 

Vassili  F,  1505-1533 

1506.  Expedition  against  Kazan. 

1508.  Poland-Lithuania. 

1511-1526.  Poland-Lithuania. 

1521.  Rebellion  in  Kazan. 

1524.  Expedition  to  Kazan. 

1527-1529.  Tatar  invasions. 

1530-1531.  Kazan. 

1533.  Tatar  invasions. 

Regency,  1533-1547 

1534-1537.  Poland-Lithuania. 

1535.  Tatar  invasion. 

1535.  Rebellion  of  Kazan. 
1538-1547.  Country  overrun  by  foes  on  every  side,  during  minority. 

Ivan  the  Terrible,  1547-1584 


1547.  Expedition  against  Kazan. 
1549-1553.  Final  war  on  Kazan. 
1554-1555.  Conquest  of  Astrakhan. 
1554-1557.  Sweden. 


80  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

1557-1561.  Livonian  Order. 
1559-1561.  Sweden. 

1561-1570.  Livonian  Order  and  Denmark. 
1561-1571.  Poland. 
1569.  Tatars. 

1571.  Tatar  raids. 
1572-1583.  Sweden. 

1572.  Tatar  raids. 

1575-1582.  Poland;  ended  by  Treaty  of  lam  Zapolski. 
1581-1582.  Ermak's  expedition  to  conquer  Siberia. 

Feodor  /,  1584-1598 

1590-1595.  Sweden. 
1591-1594.  Tatar  khan. 

1595.  Expedition  against  Shavkal. 

1598.  Expedition  against  Kuchum. 

Boris  Godunov,  1598-1605 

1601-1604.  Famine  and  brigandage. 

1604-1605.  Invasion  of  Russia  by  the  First  False  Dmitri. 

1605.  Expedition  in  Daghestan. 

1606.  Overthrow  of  the  First  False  Dmitri. 

Vassili  ShuisH,  1606-1610 

1607-1610.  War  of  the  Second  False  Dmitri,  the  Brigand  of  Tushino. 
1607-1609.  Sweden. 
1609-1618.  Poland. 

Interregnum,  1610-1613 
1610-1611.  Sweden. 

Michael  Romanov,  1613-1645 

1613-1617.  Sweden;  ended  by  Peace  of  Stolbove. 
1632-1634.  Poland;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Polianovka. 
1633.  Tatar  inroads. 

Regency,  1645-1650 
1648.  Riot  at  Moscow. 

Alexis,  1650-1676 

1654-1656.  Poland;  ended  by  Armistice  of  Vilna. 
1656-1658.  Sweden;  ended  by  truce  of  Valiesar.    (Peace  of  Cardis, 
1661.) 


RUSSIA  81 

1658-1659.  War  against  Vygovski  and  part  of  the  Cossacks. 
1658-1667.  Poland;  ended  by  Peace  of  Andrussowo. 
1668-1681.  The  Cossacks  of  the  right  bank  of  the  Dnieper. 
1669-1671.  Revolt  of  Stenko  Razin. 

Feodor  III,  1676-1682 
1671-1681.  Tatars;  ended  by  peace  between  tsar  and  sultan. 

Regency,  1682-1689 
1682.  Revolt  of  the  Streltsi. 
1684.  Less  important  revolt  of  the  Streltsi. 
1687-1699.  Turkey;  the  first  with  Turkey  herself. 

1689.  Fighting  with  the  Chinese  in  the  Amur  Valley. 

Peter  the  Great,  1689-1725 

1695-1696.  Expeditions  to  Azov. 

1698.  Last  revolt  of  the  Streltsi. 
1700-1721.  Sweden.   Third  Great  Northern  War;  ended  by  Peace 
of  Nystad. 

1705.  Revolt  in  Astrakhan. 
1711-1712.  Turkey;  ended  by  Peace  of  Pruth. 
1720-1721.  English  fleet  in  war  against  Russia. 

1722.  Persia. 

Catkenne  I,  1725-1727 

Regency,  1727-1730 

Anne,  1730-1740 

1733-1735.  Poland  and  France.  War  of  the  Polish  Succession. 
1725-1739.  Turkey;  ended  by  Peace  of  Belgrade. 

Regency,  1740-1741 
1741-1743.  Sweden;  ended  by  Peace  of  Abo. 

Elizabeth,  1741-1762 
1757-1762.  Prussia.   Seven  Years'  War. 

^       Catherine  11,  1762-1796 

1768-1772.  War  against  the  Confederation  of  Bar. 

1768-1774.  Turkey;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Kuchuk-Kainardji. 

1773-1774.  Pugachev's  revolt. 

1783-1784.  Seizure  of  the  Crimea. 


82  IS  WAK  DBimiSHING? 

1787-1792.  Turkey;  ended  by  Peace  of  Jassy. 
1788-1790.  Sweden;  ended  by  Peace  of  Verelii. 

1792.  Attack  on  Poland;  leading  to  Second  Partition. 

1794.  Struggle  leading  to  the  Third  Partition  of  Poland. 
1795-1796.  Persia. 

Paul,  1796-1801 

1798-1800.  France;  Russia  joining  the  Second  Coalition. 
1804-1813.  Persia. 

Alexander  7,  1810-1825 

1805-1807.  France.    The  War  of  the  Third  Coalition;   ended  by 

Peace  of  Tilsit. 
1806-1812.  Turkey;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Bucharest. 
1807-1812.  England. 

1808-1809.  Sweden,  and  the  acquisition  of  Finland.  Peace  of  Fried- 
richsham. 
1809.  Austria;  a  nominal  war  as  ally  of  France. 
1812-1814.  France;  ended  by  First  Treaty  of  Paris. 

1812.  Prussia,  the  ally  of  France;  ended  by  Convention  of 
Tauroggen. 
1812-1813.  Austria. 

1813-1814.  Denmark,  the  ally  of  France. 
1815.  France. 

Nicholas  I,  1825-1855 

1825.  Rising  of  the  Decembrists. 
1826-1828.  Persia. 

1827.  Turkey;  aid  given  the  Greeks  at  Navarino. 
1828-1829.  Turkey;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Adrianople. 
1829-1864.  War  in  the  Lesghian  Hills  against  Shamil. 
1830-1832.  Revolt  in  Poland. 
1839-1842.  War  in  Khiva. 
1840-1841.  Aid  given  Prussia  and  Austria  at  Cracow,  then  in  revolt 

1849.  Aid  given  Austria  in  Hungary,  and  Capitulation  of  Vil- 
lages. 
1853-1856.  Turkey;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Paris.   Crimean  War. 
1854-1856.  England;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Paris.   Crimean  War. 
1854-1856.  France;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Paris.   Crimean  War. 
1855-1856.  Sardinia;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Paris.   Crimean  War. 

Alexander  II,  1855-1881 

1861.  Riots  in  Poland. 

1863.  Insurrection  in  Poland.   "Order  is  restored  in  Poland." 

1865.  Conquest  of  Turkestan. 


RUSSIA  83 

1868.  Conquest  of  Bokhra. 
1873.  Conquest  of  Khiva. 
1876.  Conquest  of  Khocand. 
1877-1878.  Turkey;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Berlin. 

1881.  Subjection  of  the  last  Turkoman  tribes. 

Alexander  III,  1881-1894 

Nicholas  11,  1894- 

1900.  Participation  in  suppression  of  Boxer  rebellion. 
1904-1905.  Japan;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Portsmouth. 
1914-        .  Germany,  Austria,  and  Turkey.  ^ 


XI 

SPAIN 

The  war  curve  for  Spain  shows  very  high  per- 
centages, especially  from  1450  to  1700;  76,  55, 
91,  96,  68  are  percentages  exceeded  nowhere 
in  this  research,  except  in  the  same  period  in 
the  history  of  Turkey.  While  it  is  true  that 
the  second  half  of  her  history  is  more  peaceful 
than  the  first,  the  whole  distribution  of  dates 
cannot  be  considered  very  encouraging  to 
those  who  hope  for  universal  peace.  The  low- 
est percentage,  28,  occurs  1750-1800,  while 
the  nineteenth  century  averages  more  than 
50  per  cent  of  war.  In  a  general  way  it  may 
be  said  that  Spain  fought  more  in  the  era 
when  she  was  great  than  in  the  days  of  her 
degeneracy.  Her  entire  history  may  be  di- 
vided into  three  periods.  In  the  first,  1450- 
1600,  she  was  strong,  fighting  74  per  cent  of 
the  time.  In  the  second,  1600-1750,  she  dis- 
integrated, fighting  74.3  per  cent  of  the  time. 
In  the  third,  she  remained  weak,  fighting 
45  per  cent  of  the  time.  The  great  harmful- 
ness  of  the  third  period  was  that  her  wars 
were  fought  to  no  purpose  and  were  to  a  great 
extent    internal    disturbances.     The    great 


SPAIN 


85 


trouble  with  the  wars  of  the  middle  period  was 
that  she  lost  them. 

Below  are  the  years  of  war  during  each 
half-century  and  century. 


1500 

1600 

1700 

1800 

1900 

38 

27.5 

45.5 

48 

34 

29.5 

19 

30  , 

23.5 

73 

82 

48.5 

53.5 

Spain,  1479-1914 

Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  1479-1504 
1476-1492.  The  Moors  of  Spain. 

1479.  Portugal. 

1480.  Moroccan  expedition. 
1487.  Moroccan  expedition. 
1490.  Moroccan  expedition. 

1495-1497.  France,  in  Italy. 

1497.  Moroccan  expedition. 

1501.  Revolt  of  the  Moriscos. 

1501.  Revolt  in  Naples,  Spain  aiding  the  French. 
1502-1504.  France,  in  Italy. 


Ferdinand,  Regent,  1504-1516 
1508-1510.  Venice.  War  of  the  League  of  Cambrai. 
1509-1510.  African  conquests  of  Cisneros. 
1511-1513.  France.  War  of  the  "Holy  League." 

Charles  F,  1517-1566 

1519-1521.  Conquest  of  Mexico  by  Hernando  Cortez. 

1520-1521.  Revolt  of  the  Communides. 

1521-1526.  First  war  against  Francis  I,  of  France;  ended  by  Treaty 

of  Madrid. 
1521-1527.  The  Pope  and  Venice;  the  sack  of  Rome. 
1526-1529.  Second  war  against  Francis  I;  ended  by  Peace  of  Cam- 
brai. 
1531-1535.  Conquest  of  Peru  by  Francisco  Pizarro. 

1535.  Expedition  against  Tunis. 
1536-1538.  Third  war  against  Francis  I;  ended  by  Peace  of  Nice. 
1536-1541.  Civil  war  in  Peru. 

1541.  Expedition  against  Algiers. 


86  IS  WAK  DIMINISHING? 

1542-1544.  Fourth  war  against  Francis  I;  ended  by  Peace  of  Crepy. 
1552-1559.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Cateau-Cambresis. 
1559-1564.  Turkey. 

Philip  II,  1566-1598 

1566-1567.  Revolt  of  the  Dutch  "Beggars." 
1568-1609.  War  of  the  Dutch  Independence. 
1569-1580.  Turkey.  Campaign  of  Lepanto.  , 
1569-1571.  Revolt  of  the  Moriscos  m  Spain.     ' 
1579-1582.  War  against  Don  Antonio  in  Portugal. 
1585-1604.  England.  Campaign  of  the  Armada.     . 
1589-1598.  France.  Spain  the  ally  of  the  Catholic  League. 
1591.  Revolt  in  Zaragossa. 

Philip  III,  1598-1621 

1604.  Expedition  against  the  Turks. 

1610-1614.  Turkey. 

1615-1617.  Savoy. 

1617-1621.  Venice. 

1618-1619.  Turkey. 

Philip  IV,  1621-1665  ^ 

1620-1648.  Participation  in  the  Thirty  Years'  War. 
1621-1648.  Resumption  of  war  with  Holland. 
1625-1630.  England. 
1629-1631.  France.  War  of  the  Mantuan  Succession. 

1631.  Rebellion  in  Vizcaya. 
1635-1659.  France;  ended  by  the  Peace  of  the  Pyrenees. 

1637.  Riots  in  Portugal. 
163&-1659.  Separatist  war  in  Catalonia. 
1640-1668.  War  of  Portuguese  Independence. 

1641.  Revolt  in  Andalusia. 
1646-1647.  Revolts  in  Sicily. 
1647-1648.  Revolts  in  Naples. 
1654-1659.  England. 

Regency,  1665-1679 

1666-1667.  Barbary  States. 
1667-1668.  France.     War  of  Devolution. 
1672-1678.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Nijmwegen. 
1672-1673.  Barbary  States. 


SPAIN  87 

Charles  IL  1679-1700 

1681.  Barbary  States. 

1683-1684.  France. 

1688-1697.  France.  War  of  the  League  of  Augsburg. 

1688-1689.  Barbary  States. 

1693-1694.  Barbary  States. 

Philip  F,  1700-1745 

1701-1713.  Ally  of  France  against  Austria,  England,  Holland,  etc. 
1705-1715.  Rebellion  in  Catalonia. 

1717.  Seizure  of  Sardinia. 
1718-1720.  England,  France,  Austria,  Holland.  War  of  the  Quad- 
ruple Alliance. 
1727-1729.  England. 

1733-1735.  Austria.  War  of  the  Polish  Succession. 
1739-1748.  England.  War  of  Jenkins's  Ear. 
1740-1748.  Ally  of  France  in  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession. 

Ferdinand  VI,  1745-1759 

Charles  III,  1759-1788 

1762-1763.  England  and  Portugal. 
1766.  Riots  in  Madrid. 

1770.  Trouble  with  England  in  the  Falkland  Islands. 
1775.  Moroccan  War. 

Charles  IV,  1788-1808 

1779-1783.  England;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Versailles. 
1783-1784.  War  on  Argel. 
1793-1795.  France;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Basel. 
1796-1802.  England,  Spain  the  ally  of  France. 

1801.  War  with  Portugal. 
1804-1808.  England,  Spain  the  ally  of  France. 

Joseph  Bonaparte,  1808 
1808-1814.  Revolt  of  the  Spanish  people  against  the  French. 

Ferdinand  VII,  1814-1833 

1808-1823.  Revolt  and  Separation  of  Spain's  American  colonies. 
1816-1819.  Revolts  against  Ferdinand  VII. 

1820.  Revolt  of  Del  Riego,  etc. 
1821-1823.  Revolts  against  king,  leading  to  French  intervention. 

1830.  Liberal  revolt. 


88  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

Isabella  II,  1833-1868 

183^-1840.  Revolt  of  Don  Carlos. 
1841.  Riots. 
1844.  Revolts  in  Cuba  and  Manila. 

1846.  Revolts  in  Spain. 

1847.  CarlistWar. 
1851.  Cuban  revolt. 
1854.  Risings  in  Spain. 

1859-1860.  Morocco.  . . . 

1861-1862.  Participation  in  Mexican  expedition  of  Maximilian, 

1866.  Liberal  revolt. 

1868.  September  Revolution  under  Prim's  leadership. 

Promsional  Government  and  Regency,  1868-1869  ' 

1868-1878.  Cuban  revolt. 

1869.  Spain  in  anarchy. 

Amadeoy  1870-1873 
1872-1885.  Third  Carlist  War. 

Republic,  1873-1875 
1873-1875.  Spain  in  anarchy. 

Alphonso  XII,  1875-1885 

Regency,  1885-1902 

1895-1898.  Cuban  Revolution. 

1898.  The  United  States;  ended  by  Peace  of  Paris. 


XII 

SWEDEN 

The  curve  for  Sweden  forms  the  outline  of 
two  apexes,  one  considerably  higher  than  the 
other.  The  first  of  the  two  reaches  79  per 
cent  in  the  half -century,  1600-1650.  This 
was  the  era  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War  of 
Charles  IX,  Gustavus  Adolphus  and  Oxen- 
stierna,  of  constant  wars  in  Germany  and 
Livonia,  Denmark  or  Russia.  It  was  the 
epoch  of  the  Swedish  Empire,  if  so  it  may  be 
termed.  This  period  of  great  wars  went  on  for 
a  decade  after  the  middle  of  the  century. 
The  Second  Great  Northern  War  found 
Charles  X  (1654-1660)  at  the  head  of  an  army 
which  for  fighting  ability,  endurance,  and 
general  command  could  not  be  matched  in 
Europe,  unless  Cromwell's  Ironsides  had  been 
set  beside  them.  Swedish  infantry  had  re- 
placed Spanish  infantry  as  the  expression  of 
highest  efficiency. 

The  Swedish  Empire  was  of  short  duration, 
however,  and  at  Fehrbellin  in  1675  the  Great 
Elector  of  Brandenburg  dealt  it  a  telling 
blow.  This  half-century  (1650-1700)  was  one 
of  only  21  per  cent  of  war.  It  was  followed 
by  the  lesser  apex,  the  Third  Great  Northern 


90  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

War,  when  that  mad  genius,  Charles  XII, 
marched  over  all  the  countries  of  the  North 
to  find  himself  in  the  end  a  beaten  fugitive  at 
Bender,  where  Turkish  hospitality  afforded  a 
poor  consolation.  With  the  termination  of 
this  last  Great  Northern  War  in  1721,  Sweden 
ceased  to  rank  as  a  great  power  and  her 
battles  became  less  frequent.  Her  part  in  the 
Seven  Years'  War  was  at  no  time  impressive. 
A  few  disastrous,  and  important,  wars  with 
Russia,  when  Sweden  lost  Finland,  and  her 
participation  in  the  Napoleonic  struggles, 
were  the  only  serious  contests  in  the  last  two 
centuries. 

WTien  Sweden  was  a  great  power,  she 
fought  her  maximum  years  of  war.  She  has 
not  been  a  fighter  since.  In  this  respect 
Sweden  resembles  Holland,  and  both  differ 
from  Spain,  where  civil  war  took  the  place 
of  the  grand  wars  of  the  earlier  centuries. 
Sweden,  like  Holland  and  Denmark,  has 
shown  herself  fairly  well  capacitated  for  self- 
government  and  the  maintenance  of  contin- 
ued peace.  Her  civil  wars  have  not  been 
unusually  frequent.  Her  early  wars  against 
Denmark,  in  the  period  1453-1500,  though 
almost  civil  wars,  —  since  it  was  a  continually 
recurring  question  at  this  time  whether  the 
two  Northern  kingdoms  should  or  should  not 
remain  under  the  same  joint  ruler,  —  were  not 


SWEDEN 


91 


suflSciently  numerous  to  raise  the  average  to 
more  than  43  per  cent.  It  was  only  her  en- 
trance into  a  career  of  conquest  and  her  chal- 
lenge of  great  European  kingdoms  and  of  the 
Empire  that  raised  her  war  percentage  to  77, 
an  amount  so  frequently  seen  for  other  na- 
tions when  exercising  political  importance. 

The  war  years  for  Sweden  are  here  given  by 
half-centuries  and  by  centuries. 


15 

00 

16 

00 

1700 

1800 

1900 

21.5 

21.5 

29 

39.5 

.  10.5 

22.5 

7 

6.5 

0.0 

50.5 

50 

29.5 

6.5 

Sweden,  1450-1914 
Confused  and  disputed  rule,  1446-1523 

1451-1457.  War  in  Sweden  against  Christian  I,  of  Denmark. 

1463-1465.  Denmark,  in  Scania. 

1467-1471.  Second  war  against  Christian  I,  of  Denmark.  Battle  of 
Brunkeberg. 

1491-1510.  Russia. 

1496-1497.  War  between  John,  of  Sweden,  and  Steno  Sture,  ad- 
ministrator. 

1501-1513.  Denmark.  War  waged  by  the  Sture  family  largely. 

1516-1520.  Denmark  conquered  Sweden.  Massacre  at  Stockholm. 

1521-1524.  War  of  Liberation,  led  by  Gustavus  Vasa;  ended  by 
Peace  of  Malmoe. 


Gustavus  Vasa,  1523-1560 

1534-1536.  Ltlbeck. 

1554-1557.  Russia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Moscow. 

1559-1561.  Russia,  Sweden  the  ally  of  the  Livonian  Order. 

Eric  XIV,  1560-1568 
1563-1570.  Denmark;  ended  by  Peace  of  Stettin. 

John  III,  1568-1592 
1572-1583.  Russia,  in  Baltic  Provinces;  ended  by  a  prolonged  truce. 


9£  IS  WAR  DEMIXISHIXG? 

Siffismund,  1592-1595 
1590-1595.  Russia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Tensin. 

Si^smund  arid  Charles,  1595-1600 

1598.  War  against  King  Sigismund;  ended  by  Convention  at 
Linkoping. 

Churhs  IX.  1600-1611 

1600-1611.  Denmark;  ended  by  a  truce.   War  of  Kalmar. 

IPnri-ifioo.  Poland. 

lr;r)'-ii 'jy.  Rus.5ian  expedition  to  aid  Basil  Shuiski,  etc. 

16ijy-1611.  Russia;  against  no  organized  government. 

Gustaru^  Adolphus,  1611-1632 

161S-1617.  Russia;  against  Tsar  Michael;  ended  by  Peace  of  Stol- 

bowo. 
1616^-1618.  Denmark;  ended  by  a  truce. 
16^0-16^2.  Denmark;  ended  by  a  truce. 
16i5-16i6.  Denmark:  ended  by  a  truce. 
16^6-16^8.  Denmark;  ended  by  a  truce. 
16^6-16^9.  War  vi,-ith  the  Elector-Duke  in  Prussia. 
16iS-16£9.  Denmark.  War  of  Kalmar;  ended  by  Truce  of  Altmark. 

Regency,  1632-1644 
1630-1648.  The  Empire  and  its  allien.   Thirty  Years'  War. 

Christina,  1644-1654 
1643-1645.  Denmark;  ended  by  Peace  of  Bromsebro. 

Churks  X.  1654-1660 

1655-1660.  Poland.  Charles  X  claiming  Polish  throne;  ended  by 

Peace  of  Oliwa. 
1656-1658.  Russia:  ended  by  three-year  truce.    (Peace  of  Cardis, 

1661.; 

IPoT-l'^oS.  Denmark;  ended  by  Peace  of  Roskilde. 
lt^5~-U  • '»,   Br'andenburg-Prussia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Oliwa. 
l^'oT-l'  'I,   Th  :  Empire;  ended  by  Peace  of  Oliwa. 
165b  loGu.  Denmark;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Copenhagen. 

Regency,  1660-1672 
1665-1666.  Bremen;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Habenhausen. 


SWEDEN  93 

Charles  XI,  1672-1697 

1675-1679.  Brandenburg-Prussia,  Lunenburg,  and  Munster. 
1675-1679.  The  Empire;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Xijmwegen. 
1675-1679.  Denmark;  ended  by  Peace  of  Lund. 
1675-1679.  Holland;  ended  by  Peace  of  Xijmwegen. 

Charles  XII,  1697-1718 

1699-1700.  Denmark;  ended  by  Peace  of  Travendal. 

1700-1721.  Russia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Nystadt. 

1700-1706.  Saxonv;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Alt-RanstSdt.    (Poland 

also.) 
1709-1719.  Saxony  and  Poland;  ended  by  a  truce  which  was  made 

permanent. 
1709-1720.  Denmark. 

1715-1719.  Xaval  action  of  England  against  Sweden. 
1715-1720.  Prussia. 

Ulrica  Elennor,  1719-1720 
1719-1720.  Hanover. 

Frederick  I,  1720-1751 
1741-1743.  Russia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Abo. 

AdolphiLS  Frederick,  1751-1771 
1757-1762.  Prussia;  ended  by  Truce  of  Hamburg. 

Gustavus  III,  1771-1792 

17S8-1790.  Russia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Verelu. 
1788.  Denmark,  the  ally  of  Russia. 

Gustavus  IV,  1792-1809 

1805-1810.  France;  ended  by  Peace  of  Paris.    War  of  the  Third 

Coalition. 
1808-1809.  Russia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Friedrichsham. 
1808-1809.  Denmark,  the  ally  of  Russia. 

Charles  XIII,  1809-1819 

1813-1814.  Denmark,  Sweden  in  alliance  vnth.  powers.    Peace  of 

Kiel. 
1813-1814.  France,  Sweden  in  alliance  with  powers. 
1815.  France. 


XIII 

TURKEY 


1500 

Years  of  War 

1600                        1700 

1800 

1900 

42.5 

33 

47.5 

47 

42 

9 

14 

24  ^ 



15.5 

80.5 

89 

23 

39.5 

The  figures  given  in  the  tables  for  Turkey 
include  only  her  European  possessions;  the 
Asiatic  wars  are  excluded  for  lack  of  accu- 
rate data,  and  because,  after  all,  they  concern 
Europe  in  no  such  way  as  do  the  extra- 
European  operations  of  England  or  Russia. 
Excluded, too,  are  the  dynastic  upheavals  and 
the  personal  rivalries  for  the  throne,  most  of 
them,  to  be  sure,  very  short  and  decisive. 
Like  Spain,  and  during  the  same  century, 
1550-1650,  Turkey  fought  nearly  all  the  time. 
Indeed,  her  war  figures  for  1450-1700  afford 
the  highest  percentage  of  war  for  so  long  a 
period  shown  by  any  country.  Turkey's  wars 
were  fought  against  the  Empire,  and  in 
Hungary^  to  a  large  extent.  Her  other  great 
foes  were  Spain,  the  victor  at  Lepanto  in 
1571,  and  doughty  little  Venice,  who,  though 
unsupported,  dared  meet  the  *' unspeakable 
Turk."  What  a  bulwark  Venice  was  against 
him !  Like  Poland,  she  sacrificed  much  of  her 


TURKEY  95 

own  future  in  intercepting  from  Western 
Europe  the  blows  of  the  less  civilized  Asiatic. 
Since  the  Peace  of  Passarowitz  in  1718, 
Turkey  has  ceased  to  be  a  formidable  foe  and 
her  number  of  wars  has  declined  decidedl3^ 
The  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  was 
more  warlike  than  the  preceding  because  of 
countless  risings  in  the  Balkans,  and  the 
aggressive  policy  of  Russia;  still  the  per- 
centage does  not  rise  to  fifty.  The  one  fact 
that  stands  out  most  prominently  in  the 
history  of  Turkish  wars  is  the  abrupt  f alling- 
off  after  the  year  1700.  Since  1900,  Turkey 
has  been  involved  in  three  wars,  including  the 
present  one.  The  first,  against  Italy,  and  the 
second,  the  Balkan  War,  both  short  but  very 
disastrous  to  the  Ottoman  Empire. 

Turkey,  1450-1914 

Murad  II,  1421-1451 

1450-1453.  Greek  Empire;  ended  by  the  capture  of  Constantinople. 
1450-1454.  Venice. 

Mahommed  II,  1451-1481 

1451-1461.  War  with  Scanderbeg,  of  Albania. 

1454-1458.  Invasion  of  Serbia. 

1454-1456.  Himiadi. 

1458-1462.  Greek  War. 

1462-1464.  Conquest  of  Wallachia  and  Bosnia. 

1463-1464.  Huniadi  in  Hungary. 

1463-1479.  Venice. 

1464-1467.  Scanderbeg. 

1469-1480.  The  Empire. 

1474.  Repulse  in  Albania. 

1475.  Repulse  in  Moldavia. 


96  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

1480-1481.  Attack  on  Apulia. 
1480.  Attack  on  Rhodes. 


Bayezed  11,  1481-1512 

1482-1483. 

Hungarian  aggressions. 

1486-1489. 

Poland. 

1490-1495. 

Hungarj'. 

1497. 

Poland. 

1498-1503. 

Venice. 

1499-1502. 

Hungarian  War. 

Selim  Z,  1512-1520 

1512^1519. 

Hungary. 

Suleiman  I,  1520-1566 

1521-1531. 

The  Empire. 

1522. 

Conquest  of  Rhodes. 

1532-1534. 

The  Empire. 

1535. 

Spain  and  the  Empire. 

1536-1540. 

Venice. 

1537-1547. 

The  Empire. 

1538-1547. 

The  Pope. 

1541. 

Spain.   Algerian  expedition  of  Charles  V. 

1551-1562. 

The  Empire  and  Hungary. 

1559-1564. 

Spain. 

Selim  II,  1566-1574 

1565-1568.  The  Empire. 

1569-1580.  Spain.  Campaign  of  Lepanto. 

1570-1573.  Venice  and  the  Pope. 

Murad  III,  1574-1595 

1575-1593.  Partisan  warfare  in  Hungary. 

1583-1590.  Poland. 

1593-1606.  Active,  or  nominal,  war  with  the  Empire  and  Hungary. 

Mahomm£d  III,  1595-1603 
1596-1606.  Rising  of  the  Balkans. 

Ahm^d  7,  1603-1617 

1604.  Spanish  expedition  against  Turks. 
1607-1609.  Irruptions  of  Cossacks  on  Black  Sea. 


TURKEY  97 


1607-1624.  Turkey  involved  in  the  Moldavian  War. 

1610-1614.  Spain. 

1616-1617.  Sea  raids  of  Jean  Pierre. 


Osman  11,  1618-1622 


1618-1619.  Spain. 
1618-1621.  Poland. 


Mustafa  7,  1622-1623 
Murad  IV,  1623-1640 

1625-1626.  Cossack  raids  in  Black  Sea  region. 

1627.  Cossack  raids  in  Black  Sea  region. 
1627-1645.  State  of  war  in  Moldavia. 

1628.  Cossack  raids  in  Black  Sea  region. 
1632-1634.  Poland. 

1637.  Cossacks  again  in  Black  Sea  region. 

Ibrahim,  1640-1648 

1645-1669.  Venice. 

1646-1648.  Tatar  and  Turkish  raids  in  Poland. 

Regency,  1648-1663 

1657-1662.  Hungary;  against  Rakoczy  and  the  foes  of  Poland. 
1661-1664.  The  Empire.  Campaign  of  St.  Gothard. 

Mahommed  IV,  1663-1687 

1663-1664.  France,  the  ally  of  the  Emperor  at  St.  Gothard. 

1672.  Poland. 
1673-1675.  Poland. 
1677-1681.  Russian  Cossacks;  ended  by  a  peace  with  the  tsar  himi 

self. 
1682-1699.  Austria;  ended  by  Peace  of  Carlo witz. 
1683-1699.  The  Empire;  ended  by  Peace  of  Carlowitz. 
1683-1699.  Poland;  ended  by  Peace  of  Carlowitz. 
1683-1699.  Venice;^ended  by  Peace  of  Carlowitz. 

'Suleiman  II,  1687-1691 
Ahm£d  II,  1691-1695 

1687-1699.  Russia. 

Mustafa  II,  1695-1703 


gs  IS  WAR  DIMINISHING? 

Ahmed  III,  1703-1730 
1711-1712.  Russia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Pruth. 
171-4-1718.  Venice;  ended  by  Peace  of  Passaro-tv-itz. 

Mahmud  Z,  1730-1754 

1716-1718.  Austria. 

1735-1739.  Russia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Belgrade. 

1737-1739.  Austria;  ended  by  Peace  of  Belgrade. 

Osman  III,  1754-1757 

Mustafa  III,  1757-1773 

1768-1774.  Russia;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Kuchuk-Kainaxdji. 
1770.  Revolt  of  Greeks. 

Abd-ul-Hamid,  1773-1789  .- 
1783-1784.  Loss  of  the  Crimea. 
1787-1792.  Russia;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Jassy. 
1787-1791.  Austria. 

Selim  III,  1789-1807 

1798-1801.  France.   Bonaparte's  SjTian  campaign. 

1802-1803.  Revolt  of  the  SuUots. 

1804-1812.  Serbian  rebellion. 

1806-1812.  Russia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Bucharest. 

Mustafa  IV,  1807-1808 

1807.  English  attack  on  Constantinople. 

Mahmud  II,  1808-1839  ' 

1815.  Serbian  rebeUion. 

1816.  English  attack  on  Algiers. 
1820-1822.  Revolt  of  Ah  Pasha  in  Epirus. 

1821-1829.  War  of  Greeks  for  their  independence  from  Turkey. 

1827.  Interference  of  powers  in  aid  of  Greeks  at  Navarino. 

1828-1829.  Russia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Adrianople. 

1830.  Insurrection  in  the  Balkans. 

1831-1833.  Revolt  of  Mehemet  Ali. 

Abd-ul-Mej{d,lS39-lS61 
1839-1841.  Second  revolt  of  Mehemet  Ali. 
1852-1853.  Montenegro. 

1853-1856.  Russia;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Paris.   Crimean  War. 
1858.  Second  war  with  Montenegro. 


TURKEY 

Abd-ul-Aziz,  1861-1876 
1861-1862.  Third  war  with  Montenegro. 

1862.  Bombardment  of  Belgi'ade. 
1866-1869.  Revolt  of  Crete. 
1875-1876.  Revolt  of  the  Herzegovina. 
1875-1876.  Massacres  in  Bulgaria. 

Ahd-ul-Hamid  77,  1876-1909 

1876-1877.  War  in  Serbia  and  Montenegro. 
1877-1878.  Russia;  ended  by  Peace  of  Berlin 
1894-1896.  Armenian  Massacres. 
1896-1898.  Revolt  of  Crete. 

1897.  Greek  War;  ended  by  Treaty  of  Constaotmople. 

Mahommed  V,  1909- 

1911.  Italy. 

1912.  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  and  Greece. 

1914-        .  Russia,  Engl^id,  France,  Serbia,  and  allies. 


APPENDIX 


20    1730    1? 


'20    1730    1 


c 


^ 


n 


rt 


nnr 


ffl._jSa 


^ 


HE 


Mf 


UK 


TifinrF 


8 


ILH 


APPENDIX 

CHART  A 

The  reader  will  observe  that  on  Chart  A  the  countries 
are  arranged  so  that  each  is  next  to  those  with  which 
it  has  been  most  at  war.  In  this  way  we  are  able  to  see 
at  a  glance  the  Russo-Swedish  War  of  the  late  fifteenth 
and  early  sixteenth  centuries,  the  two  wars  of  Turkey 
and  Austria,  in  the  first  half  of  the  sixteenth  century, 
and  the  two  in  the  second  half.  The  War  for  Dutch 
Independence  is  clean-cut  in  the  columns  of  Holland 
and  Spain,  while  England's  share  in  the  struggle  is 
manifest.  Poland,  Russia,  Sweden,  and  Denmark  ex- 
hibit the  First  Great  Northern  War  of  the  second  half 
of  the  sixteenth  century.  Glancing  to  the  right,  one 
sees  the  black  patch  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War  (1618- 
1648),  in  which  the  Second  Great  Northern  War  is 
merged;  then  the  double  streak  of  the  War  of  the 
League  of  Augsburg  in  the  West  and  the  conflict  in  the 
East  which  led  to  the  Peace  of  Carlowitz  in  1669.*  After 
that  comes  the  black  strip  that  marks  the  War  of  the 
Spanish  Succession,  the  Third  Great  Northern  War, 
and  the  Turkish  war  that  ended  at  Passarowitz  in 
1718. 

There  was  no  break  in  the  continuity  of  black  from 
1450  to  1721.  During  this  period  of  two  hundred  and 
seventy-one  years  there  was  no  year  in  which  at  least 
one  of  the  eleven  nations,  whose  wars  are  here  tabu- 
lated, was  not  fighting.  Four  short  spaces  of  time 
present  themselves  in  which  all  of  the  countries  were 
at  war,  when  an  unbroken  line  of  black  is  to  be  seen 
from  top  to  bottom  of  the  figure.  These  little  stretches, 


104  APPENDIX 

however,  possess  no  significance  of  their  own  indicat- 
ing any  particular  series  of  events.  With  the  Treaty  of 
Nystadt,  between  Russia  and  Sweden  in  1721,  the 
Temple  of  Janus  was  closed  for  the  first  time  in  modern 
history.  From  this  time  on  constant  breaks  occur  in 
the  chart's  columns  of  black.  After  1721  the  first 
striking  period  of  warfare  is  that  of  the  Austrian  Suc- 
cession; next  that  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  and  a  half- 
century  later,  the  chart  shows  in  hea\'y  black  the 
Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  conflicts.  From  Water- 
loo, a  century  ago,  to  the  summer  of  1914,  no  war  has 
enveloped  Europe  as  a  whole;  they  have  been  fewer 
and  of  duration  so  comparatively  short  that,  on  a  chart 
such  as  this,  they  present  a  slight  appearance. 


CHARTS  B,  C,  AND  D 

Has  the  decrease  in  number  of  years  of  war  been  as 
great  proportionally  for  what  are  to-day  the  great 
powers  of  Europe  as  it  has  been  for  what  are  to-day 
the  impotent  or  decadent  states  of  Europe?  A  scrutiny 
of  Chart  D,  where  are  compared  the  average  curves  of 
the  five  strong  powers  of  to-day  and  five  weak  nations 
of  to-day,  together  with  the  average  curve  of  all,  shows 
that  the  lesser  nations  saw  a  more  complete  decline  in 
war  than  the  greater.  The  general  proportion  of  the 
figure  of  Chart  C  (that  of  the  lesser  nations)  is  of  a 
slope  from  left  to  right,  while  that  of  Chart  B  (that  of 
the  greater  nations)  is  much  more  nearly  horizontal. 

Prussia  has  had  a  great  decrease;  so  has  Austria;  but 
England,  France,  and  Russia  show  a  far  less  decided 
downward  curve.  On  the  other  hand,  Turkey  ceased 
to  fight  many  great  wars.  Denmark,  Sweden  and  Hol- 
land either  ceased  fighting  altogether,  or  dropped  from 
the  ranks  of  belligerents  to  all  practical  intents. 

The  great  powers  are  not  the  powers  that  have  lost 


1^ 


1450-1500           1500   1550           1550-1600 

1600-1650           1650-1700           17   0-1750           17   0-18 

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APPENDIX  105 

the  military  taste;  the  small  states  are  the  homes  of 
peaceful  policy.  This  may  not  be  a  sure  historical 
generalization,  but  it  is  at  least  a  suggestion  that  can- 
not be  avoided. 


CAMBRIDGE  .  MASSACHUSETTS 
U   .   S    .  A 


University  of  California 

SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

405  Hilgard  Avenue.  Los  Angeles,  CA  90024-1388 

Return  this  material  to  the  library 

from  which  it  was  borrowed. 


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A     000  178  306     7 


